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INTRODUCTION
S CANDALS involving such modem-day Al Capones as Ivan Boesky
and Dennis Levine' have motivated Congress to enact strong meas-
ures to combat insider trading.2 In 1984, Congress raised the potential
penalties to "three times the profit gained or loss avoided" from insider
trading under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act3 ("ITSA"). Insider
trading scandals, however, continued after the enactment of ITSA,
prompting Congress to adopt the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act4 ("ITSFEA") in 1988. ITSFEA imposes liability for
1. Gary Lynch, former director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") Enforcement Division, has remarked that "the insider trading wars truly began"
on May 12, 1986, when the SEC filed charges against Dennis Levine. See Lynch, Fore-
word-Insider Trading Symposium, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 3, 5 (1988) (citing SEC v.
Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1986)). Mr. Levine settled with the SEC for
$11.6 million and a permanent bar from the securities industry, pleading guilty to four
felony counts. On the criminal side, Mr. Levine received a two-year prison sentence and
a $362,000 fine. See Wise, Levine Sentence Seen in Line with Insider-Trading Penalties,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 3. After the Levine affair, the SEC quickly filed
charges against Ivan Boesky, a famous Wall Street arbitrageur, alleging that Mr. Boesky
obtained material nonpublic information from Mr. Levine concerning tender offers,
mergers, and other corporate transactions. See Lynch, supra, at 5 (citing SEC v. Boesky,
No. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986)). Mr. Boesky consented to a combination of
disgorgement and civil penalties totaling a record $100 million, a guilty plea on felony
charges, and a permanent bar from the securities industry. See Judge Morris Lasker
Sentencing Boesky, N.J.L.J., Dec. 31, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
2. The term "insider trading" covers a wide variety of unlawful trading by persons
who possess material nonpublic information. For example, Mr. Levine and Mr. Boesky
were market professionals who did not hold positions within the corporations giving rise
to the information that they used to trade. The purpose of this Article is to advocate the
repeal of section 16(b); thus, this Article focuses upon a limited group of corporate insid-
ers including directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
3. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered subsec-
tions of 15 U.S.C. § 78). See infra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78). Congress enacted ITSFEA to "provide greater deter-
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insider trading upon persons who have some control over insiders in or-
der to induce those persons to take steps to prevent insider trading viola-
tions.' In enacting ITSA and ITSFEA, Congress focused on deterring
insider trading, while continuing to allow the courts to define the sub-
stantive violation of insider trading under Rule lOb-5.
Fifty years before ITSA, Congress envisioned a very different form of
attack upon insider trading. Congress enacted section 16(b) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, believing that the only effective means to
control insider trading was to impose strict liability upon a narrow group
of insiders for a limited range of trades, without requiring any proof that
inside information was actually used.
Although most reform efforts have concentrated on deterring insider
trading under "the Rule lOb-5 regime,",6 deterrence is also the primary
goal of section 16(b).' This Article considers whether the methods used
to deter insider trading under section 16(b) are economically efficient in
light of the modem weapons in the insider trading arsenal. Insider trad-
ing regulation should minimize both the social harm caused by insider
rence, detection and punishment of violations of insider trading." House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6043, 6044 [hereinafter 1988 House Report].
5. See infra notes 156-166 and accompanying text.
6. This Article uses the term "Rule lOb-5 regime" to refer to the substantive regula-
tion of insider trading under Rule lob-5 and Rule 14e-3 promulgated by the SEC under
sections 10(b) and 14(e), respectively, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as
the deterrence mechanisms under ITSA and ITSFEA.
7. Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any inten-
tion on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may
be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of
the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such ben-
eficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which
the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended
within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Compensating victims is also a significant goal of insider trad-
ing regulation. See Karjala, Statutory Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Mar-
kets, 1982 Duke L.J. 627, 629-33. This Article concludes, however, that the regulation of
insider trading should pursue the goal of compensation only to the extent that it does not
conflict with the goal of deterrence. See infra notes 326-328 and accompanying text.
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trading and the enforcement costs incurred in the fight against it.' This
Article uses this cost-minimization principle to compare the efficiency of
the oldest system to prevent insider trading, section 16(b), with the newer
methods provided by ITSA and ITSFEA. This comparison demon-
strates that the same level of deterrence produced by section 16(b) could
be achieved more efficiently by methods subsequently added to the Rule
lOb-5 regime. Thus, this Article concludes that the repeal of section
16(b) would promote the efficient regulation of insider trading.'
Part I provides an overview of cost-minimization principles used in
developing an efficient deterrence strategy.' ° This Part considers the fre-
quency of insider trading and the social harm it causes to demonstrate
the difficulties in applying economic deterrence theories in formulating a
regulatory response to the problem. " This Part then presents the histori-
cal development of insider trading regulation under section 16(b) and
Rule lOb-5, including recent developments under ITSA and ITSFEA.'2
This historical presentation reveals that for over half a century, practi-
tioners and academicians have criticized section 16(b) and questioned its
efficacy. In addition, this historical perspective demonstrates that the
Rule lOb-5 regime provides a much more powerful deterrent than does
section 16(b).
8. Gary Becker was the first modem scholar to use an economic approach to the
deterrence of illegal activity. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). Professor Dooley applied this law and economics
approach to insider trading regulation under Rule lOb-5 in 1980, but did not include an
analysis of section 16(b). See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 3 (1980). For earlier economic comparisons of section 16(b) with Rule 1Ob-5
prior to the enactment of ITSA and ITSFEA, see Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation:
An Examination of Section 16(b) and a Proposal for Japan, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 449
(1979); Note, An Economic Analysis of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 389 (1976) [hereinafter Note, An Economic Analysis];
Note, A Framework for the Allocation of Prevention Resources with a Specific Application
to Insider Trading, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 975 (1976) [hereinafter Note, A Framework]. The
Becker model has been used extensively in the antitrust context. See, eg., K. Elzinga &
W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics 112-16 (1976);
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 Geo. L.J. 1075,
1076-81 (1980). Some commentators have criticized the economic approach to the "psy-
chology of deterrence" as being "too mechanical." Hovenkamp & Schwartz, Treble
Damages and Antitrust Deterrence: A Dialogue, 18 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 67, 79
(1986) (comment by Professor Schwartz).
9. For recent commentary urging the repeal or reform of section 16(b), see Samuel-
son, The Prevention of Insider Trading: A Proposal for Revising Section 16 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 25 Harv. J. Leg. 511, 522-28 (1988) (urging repeal of section
16(b) and filing section 16(a) reports 90 days in advance); Painter, How to Control Insider
Trading, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 38 (section 16(b) "eclipsed" by Rule lOb-5); Klein,
Outsider Proposes Change in Insider Trading Bill, Legal Times, Dec. 12, 1983, at 8, col. 1
(Congress should repeal section 16(b) or shorten the short-swing period). See generally
Smith, Section 16(b): Too Much or Too Little?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 1989, at 5, col. I (dis-
cussing proposed section 16(b) modifications).
10. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 44-189 and accompanying text.
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Parts II and III of this Article present two lines of analysis to support
the position that Congress should repeal section 16(b). Part II critically
examines a 1987 ABA Task Force's reasons for retaining section 16(b). 13
This analysis reveals that the Task Force's rationales are no longer valid
in light of recent developments, particularly the enactment of ITSFEA.
Part III then pursues an economic analysis of the weapons in the insider
trading arsenal and reviews factors pertaining to the deterrence of insider
trading, such as detection, punishment, and enforcement.14 ITSA and
ITSFEA change the dynamics of insider trading enforcement by destroy-
ing whatever utility section 16(b) may have once possessed. Thus, this
Article concludes that section 16(b) is an archaic, blunt weapon which no
longer serves a useful purpose in the effort to deter insider trading.
I. INSIDER TRADING AND THE DUAL SYSTEM OF REGULATION
A. An Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading
In designing an efficient deterrence strategy, it is necessary to evaluate
existing insider trading regulation for its impact on potential offenders
and the overall enforcement system.15 An economic analysis of deter-
rence starts with the assumption that a person violates the insider trading
laws in order to make a profit. This economic analysis also assumes that
in deciding whether to engage in insider trading, an insider will make a
calculation of the profits from insider trading by weighing the expected
benefits against the expected penalties. An insider will then compare the
returns from insider trading to the returns from other activities. On the
cost side of the insider trading profit equation, an insider will calculate
the expected penalty by taking into account the probability of detection,
the probability of successful prosecution, and the severity of the potential
sanction. 6 While preventing the social harm insider trading causes, an
efficient enforcement system should also attempt to minimize the expend-
itures made to influence the cost side of an insider's profit equation. To
the extent possible, a regulatory system should reduce the enforcement
costs associated with detecting, prosecuting and penalizing offenders. 7
13. See Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part II1 Reform of
Section 16, 42 Bus. Law. 1087, 1089-93 (1987) [hereinafter Section 16(b) Task Force]; see
infra notes 190-285 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 286-449 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. & Econ. 445, 449
(1985) (three types of costs must be minimized, which involve tradeoffs); Schwartz, supra
note 8, at 1076-77 (same).
16. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1076.
17. See id. In determining the optimal amount of resources to be devoted to the
insider trading problem, an alternative approach would consider the intersection of the
marginal social benefit curve and the marginal social cost curve derived from insider
trading regulation. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 13. The marginal social
benefit curve is derived from the total benefits received by reducing the harm that insider
trading causes. See id. The marginal social benefit of insider trading regulation corre-
sponds to the social harm caused by insider trading under the cost-minimization ap-
proach used above. Under either approach, from an economic standpoint, society should
1989]
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Unfortunately, an absence of empirical data impedes the application of
these economic principles to the insider trading problem. No recent evi-
dence exists to determine whether insider trading regulation has had any
significant deterrent effect.18 In addition, there is no reliable data con-
cerning the amount of social harm insider trading causes, that is, the
frequency with which the practice occurs and who it harms. Indeed, the
secretive nature of insider trading suggests that these issues may evade
empirical analysis."9 In the absence of such statistical data, several eco-
nomic theories provide insight in designing an efficient deterrence strat-
egy. These theories, however, reveal a debate over the nature of the
social harm caused by insider trading.
B. The Social Harm of Insider Trading
1. How Often Does Insider Trading Occur?
The limited empirical evidence available suggests that insider trading
is one of the most common violations of the federal securities laws."
Government informants have testified that insider trading is a wide-
spread and, within certain circles, accepted practice.2" The insider trad-
not attempt to deter all insider trading. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8, at 170 (phrasing
optimal enforcement question as, alternatively, how much resources are used to enforce
laws or how many offenses should be permitted); Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 9 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 526-27 (1968) (society must forego "complete" enforcement
because it is too costly).
18. One study reviewing section 16(a) reports concluded that the decisions in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), had no detectable impact upon the incidence of
insider trading. See Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, 5 Bell J.
Econ. & Man. Sci. 93 (1974). But see R. Clark, Corporate Law 282 (1986) (discounting
results of Jaffe study because prior to 1984, Rule 10b-5 only threatened disgorgement;
thus there was no reason to expect any increase in deterrence).
19. See, e.g., Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chi-
cago School," 1986 Duke L.J. 628, 644 (insider traders will not cooperate with empiricists
so long as practice is illegal); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1051, 1057-58 (1982) (same).
20. Several insider trading studies based upon section 16(a) reports show that insiders
consistently earn higher returns than public investors. See, e.g., J. Choper, J. Coffee & C.
Morris, Cases and Materials on Corporations 467 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing study by Ann
Poulsen and Greg Jarrell involving 172 tender offers between 1981 and 1985 that con-
cluded insider trading accounts for one-third of market activity before companies an-
nounce takeover bids); Baesel & Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from the
Profitability of Insider Trading, 14 J. Fin. & Quan. Anal. 553, 554 (1979) (studies indicat-
ing insiders on average made "unusual" returns); Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and
Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J. Law & Econ. 35, 38-46 (1968) (insiders
generally outperform the market); see also Poll Finds Majority Thinks Insider Trading Is
Common, Wall St. J., June 6, 1986, at 3, col. 2 (two out of every three people polled
thought insider trading was common).
21. Investigators have acknowledged that Ivan Boesky gave the government" 'a win-
dow on the rampant criminal conduct that has 'permeated the securities industry.'"
SEC to Bring More Insider Trading Cases, but Not for Several Months, Ruder Says, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1923 (Dec. 18, 1987). The government has also disclosed
that Mr. Boesky "'revealed that criminal conduct is at the heart of a substantial amount
SECTION 16(b)
ing scandals also reveal that two developments have increased the
expected return side22 of the insider's profit equation: hostile tender of-
fers have expanded the number of opportunities for insider trading, while
options markets have made the offense more profitable.23 Indeed, the
insider trading scandals that occurred after Ivan Boesky and Dennis Le-
vine received heavy penalties and prison terms graphically illustrate that
those who violate the insider trading laws are willing to take significant
risks to attain large returns.24
2. Who Is Hurt by Insider Trading?
There is much disagreement over the nature of the social harm that
insider trading causes. This social harm is relevant not only in determin-
ing the efficient level of enforcement, but also in establishing the analyti-
cal framework upon which insider trading regulation is based.2" The
most common rationale given for the regulation of insider trading is that
the practice undermines the expectations of fairness that are the founda-
tions of the public's confidence in the securities markets.26 Commenta-
tors have advanced more specific theories based upon three distinct
harms resulting from insider trading: injury to investors, loss in the effi-
ciency of the stock markets, and harm to the insider's corporation. This
Article takes the position that only the threat of harm to the corporation
sufficiently justifies regulating insider trading. More specifically, insider
of market activity by established securities industry professionals.'" 1988 House Report,
supra note 4, at 11 (quoting the U.S. Attorney in the Boesky case).
22. The term "deterrence" only focuses on the cost side of the violator's profit equa-
tion. No commonly used term centers upon the benefit side of the equation. See J. Wil-
son, Thinking About Crime 49 (1983).
23. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. 20 (1984) (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) ("the recent conjunc-
tion of tender offers and acquisitions with the availability of trading in standardized op-
tion contracts.... have fundamentally altered the risk-reward equation with respect to
insider trading").
24. The SEC recently brought its second largest insider trading enforcement action
against Stephen Sui-Kuan Wang, Jr., a financial analyst at Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
See Pitt & Shapiro, The Revised Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1988: A Legislative
Remedy for a Problem that Persists, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 7, 7 (1988) (citing SEC v.
Wang, No. 88 Civ. 4461 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 27, 1988)). The SEC accused Mr. Wang of
tipping information concerning pending transactions in twenty-five companies. Mr.
Wang entered a guilty plea in related criminal charges. See Former Stock Analyst Admits
Insider Guilt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at D6, col. 1. The Wang case has been called
"astonishing" because nearly all the illegal acts occurred after the civil and criminal
charges were announced against Levine and Boesky. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra, at 7-8.
25. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 29.
26. See, e.g., 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 8 (1988) (public expects stock prices
to reflect publicly available information); Report of the Task Force on Regulation of In-
sider Trading, Part I. Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 41 Bus. Law. 223, 227 (1985) ("[P]eople will not entrust their
resources to a marketplace they don't believe is fair, any more than a card player will put
his chips on the table in a poker game that may be fixed.") [hereinafter Rule lob-5 Task
Force].
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trading harms corporations by impairing the agency relationship between
management insiders and their corporations.27 Before examining this
agency theory in more detail, it is helpful to review briefly the other two
theories of the harms of insider trading.2"
Under the first theory, insider trading injures the individual investor
who trades with the insider because the investor does not share the in-
sider's informational advantage. 29 Although this argument has intuitive
appeal, insider trading that occurs through impersonal stock exchange
transactions does not harm individual investors because there is no
causal connection between an investor's decision to buy or sell a particu-
lar security and the insider's secretive trading in the same security based
upon nonpublic information. Investors follow their own strategies,
which are completely unaffected by whether an insider is also trading at
the same time. Thus, insider trading does not mislead or harm the other
investors in any way.30 Therefore, this theory does not help in establish-
ing the analytical foundation for the regulation of insider trading and in
27. See Cox, supra note 19, at 657-59.
28. Some commentators maintain that insider trading provides significant benefits
and, if legalized, corporations would allow their managers to engage in the practice.
These commentators argue that insider trading enhances market efficiency by promoting
smoother stock price changes; that it creates an efficient system for managerial compensa-
tion; and that there is no empirical evidence that it is harmful. See, e.g., H. Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market 30-31 (1966) (criticizing section 16(b), but finding
it less objectionable than insider trading regulation under Rule 10b-5); see also Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1983) (insider trading is
an efficient way to compensate corporate management); Manne, Insider Trading and the
Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547 (1970) (responding to criticism and reaffirming
position taken in Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966)); Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 260 (1968)
(regulation of insider trading under section 16(b) and Rule lOb-5 may be harmful to the
economy). Commentators who support insider trading regulation assert that insider
trading is a poor substitute for disclosure because there is too much "noise' associated
with trading; if managers were allowed to take their compensation from insider trading
they could profit from good news as well as bad news; and the fact that there is no
statistical data concerning the harms from insider trading is equally consistent with the
conclusion that such trading is not subject to scientific analysis. See Cox, supra note 19,
at 642-655; see also Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1430-37 (1967) (noting flaws in Manne's
thesis that insider trading is unfair).
29. See, e.g., Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1217, 1235-40 (1981) (insider trading induces trades that would not otherwise
occur).
30. Professor Cox has rejected this theory:
Insider trading is at most a fortuity for the investor because the investor is no
worse off when the insider trades than when the insider does not trade.... If
the insider neither trades nor discloses his confidential material information,
one can nevertheless expect the investor to pursue his trading plan. Sellers nat-
urally are disadvantaged by the nondisclosure of good news, just as buyers are
disadvantaged by the nondisclosure of bad news. These considerations, how-
ever, cast no light on why the insider's decision to trade should prompt
disclosure.
316 [Vol. 58
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determining the necessary amount of enforcement resources needed to
deter insider trading.
The second theory posits that insider trading impedes the stock mar-
ket's allocational efficiency. Under this theory, investors discount the
amount they are willing to pay for the stock of corporations whose man-
agers frequently engage in insider trading because those managers may
engage in abusive practices in order to exploit inside information, such as
manipulating corporate disclosures in order to trade."a Thus, this theory
concludes, insider trading impairs the stock market's allocational effi-
ciency because the investors' discounting causes investors to withdraw
resources from more valuable uses. This explanation, however, does not
withstand closer scrutiny.
The "investment portfolio theory" casts doubt upon the validity of the
claim that insider trading harms the stock market's allocational effi-
ciency.32 According to the investment portfolio theory, investors cannot
know in advance which firms present a risk of insider trading because of
the secretive nature of the practice.33 As a result, investors are forced to
assume that every investment presents the same risk of insider trading as
that of the market as a whole. Thus, investors will discount the value of
each firm's securities by the estimated average risk of insider trading for
all firms.34 Investors holding diversified portfolios will not be injured by
insider trading, because their losses on one security will be offset by the
higher returns from those firms whose insiders do not trade.
Given that insider trading does not harm investors who hold diversi-
fied portfolios, it follows that insider trading does not harm the stock
market's allocational efficiency. Investors' discounting for the average
risk of insider trading will cause each firm's cost of capital to rise at the
same rate. As a result, the investors' discounting for insider trading will
not affect the amount of capital that investors allocate to each firm.36
Consequently, this allocational efficiency theory cannot justify regulating
Cox, supra note 19, at 635 (footnotes omitted); see also Dooley, supra note 8, at 33
("There is no causal connection between insider trading and outsiders' losses.").
Professor Cox does not ignore the possibility that insiders injure outsiders by preempt-
ing bargaining opportunities. Professor Cox rebuts this argument by asserting that the
insiders' purchases are normally so small that they do not significantly preempt the op-
portunities of outsiders. See Cox, supra note 19, at 635 n.33. In addition, any harm to
outsiders will be offset by the benefits that insider trading produces in market efficiency.
See infra text accompanying notes 259-267.
31. See Schotland, supra note 28, at 1448-49; Mendelson, The Economics of Insider
Trading Reconsidered (Book Review), 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 470, 476-77 (1969) (reviewing
H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966)).
32. See Cox, supra note 19, at 638-39.
33. See id. at 638.
34. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 41 (citing Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons": Qual-
ity, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970)).
35. See Cox, supra note 19, at 638.
36. Professor Cox explains: "Because capital allocation occurs within the context of a
comparative assessment among competing choices, any change that affects the cost of
capital for all firms at the same rate will not affect the relative comparisons made by
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insider trading or help establish the appropriate amount of enforcement
resources. Rather, the theory demonstrates that insider trading harms
all firms because all firms will face a higher cost of capital due to investor
discounting.37 Arguments based upon the portfolio theory are consistent
with the position taken in this Article that insider trading harms corpo-
rations: investors discount the value of all firms' securities for the aver-
age risk of insider trading because it harms the agency relationship
between management insiders and their corporations.
Within any agency relationship, there is a divergence between the prin-
cipal's interests and the agent's interests, creating significant agency
costs. 38 In corporations, the interests of managers and shareholders dif-
fer because managers do not have the incentive to work as hard as they
would if they received the entire benefit from their efforts.39 To a certain
extent, managers will find it in their self-interest to shirk, embezzle and
deceive. To reduce these agency costs, shareholders attempt to motivate
managers by tying management's compensation to the shareholders'
gain. Therefore, managers are often encouraged to own and trade the
corporation's securities in order to align their interests with those of the
shareholders. 4 Although shareholders find it in their self-interest to al-
low managers to own the corporation's securities, managers will have the
incentive to abuse this privilege by trading on material inside
information.
Managers' trading on material inside information widens the diver-
gence between the shareholders' interests and the managers' interests,
thus creating additional agency costs for the corporation. If a laissez-
faire approach were taken toward insider trading, shareholders would be
unable to motivate the managers' behavior because the shareholders
would not be able to control the amount of compensation that managers
receive.41 Similarly, if managers could freely engage in insider trading,
they would have the incentive to concentrate more on their own trading
agendas at the expense of the shareholders' long-term welfare. In con-
centrating on their own trading agendas, corporate officials would at-
tempt to manipulate corporate events and the timing of information
investors that drive the allocation of capital among the various investment choices." Id.
at 639-40.
37. See id. at 640.
38. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976); see also Anderson, Conflicts of
Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 745-46
(1978) (discussing competing values of efficiency and fairness and the costs involved in
certain "exchange conflicts of interest" transactions).
39. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 774-75.
40. See Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 375, 387-89 (1983).
41. See Cox, supra note 19, at 658-59. In addition, insider trading may hurt a corpo-
ration's reputation. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d
910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82 (1969) (insider trading can harm the "prestige and
goodwill" of the company).
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releases to induce price-swings in the firm's stock in order to create op-
portunities to engage in insider trading. 2
In order to reduce the agency costs caused by the divergence of share-
holders' and management's interests, the government imposes minimum
fiduciary duties that govern the agency relationship between manage-
ment insiders and their corporations.43 The following review of the his-
torical development of insider trading regulation reveals that fiduciary
duty principles underlie the analytical framework of insider trading regu-
lation under section 16(b) and Rule lOb-5. Thus, this dual system of
insider trading regulation is based upon principles that are consistent
with the position taken in this Article, that insider trading harms the
agency relationship between managers and corporations.
C. The Historical Development of the Dual System of
Insider Trading Regulation
Since 1934, when Congress enacted section 16(b), 4 practitioners and
academicians have criticized the provision and urged its repeal because it
is ineffective in deterring insider trading. Efforts to repeal section 16(b)
became stronger when Rule lOb-5 developed in 1961 as an alternative
method of regulating insider trading. Although regulation under Rule
lOb-5 eventually overlapped with that of section 16(b), until 1984 the two
systems accomplished different regulatory goals. Section 16(b) at-
tempted to deter insiders from misusing nonpublic information in the
first place by imposing strict liability for a narrow range of transactions.
In contrast, Rule lOb-5 merely required insiders to disgorge their wrong-
ful profits from insider trading to compensate for harm after it occurred.
In enacting ITSA in 1984, Congress shifted the focus of regulation under
Rule lOb-5 from compensation to deterrence. An overview of recent de-
velopments reveals that the Rule lOb-5 regime provides a much more
powerful deterrent than section 16(b). Although the dual system of regu-
lation now has the common goal of deterring insider trading, the two
42. See Schotland, supra note 28, at 1448-49. In addition, if the corporation at-
tempted to invest in a secret project, insider trading would tend to draw attention to these
undisclosed projects and make them more costly for the corporation. See, e.g., Scott,
Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. Legal Stud. 801, 804-
05 (1980) (prohibition against insider trading protects property rights of corporation in
inside information because trading on this information is likely to raise transaction costs).
43. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 888 ("Fiduciary duties are standard-
form contractual terms that govern agency relationships. They allow the parties to avoid
excessively lengthy and detailed agreements, thereby reducing the costs of contracting."
(footnote omitted)).
44. For an in-depth discussion of section 16(b), see A. Jacobs, Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934passim (1989); L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Reg-
ulation 541-82 (1988); P. Romeo, Comprehensive Section 16 Outline: Insider Reporting
and Liability Under § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934passim (1986). For an
extensive treatment of the regulation of insider trading under Rule lOb-5, see 5 A. Ja-
cobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5 (1987); D. Langevoort, Insider Trading
Regulation (1989).
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methods "are at opposite jurisprudential poles on the objective-subjective
or predictability-fairness continuum."4 These different approaches have
prompted one commentator to remark: "Rule lOb-5 is a fairly refined
weapon aimed at discrete acts of wrongdoing. Section 16(b), on the other
hand, is a spring gun that can easily hit the innocent as well as the
guilty." '46
1. Section 16(b)'s Spring-Gun Approach
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, Congressional hearings
demonstrated that some viewed insider trading profits as a usual emolu-
ment of office:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the
subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by di-
rectors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust
and the confidential information which came to them in such positions,
to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of
abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large
stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient
control over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire
and profit by information not available to others.47
Based upon these findings, Congress enacted section 16(b) "[f]or the pur-
pose of preventing the unfair use of [inside] information which may have
been obtained by [an insider] by reason of his relationship to the is-
suer."4 8 Congress designed section 16(b) to deter what were believed to
be the most prevalent forms of the abuse of inside information.49 First,
Congress regarded a limited group of insiders as presenting the greatest
45. L. Loss, supra note 44, at 543; see also A. Conard, R. Knauss & S. Siegel, Enter-
prise Organizations 943 (1987) (although the two regimes have a common goal, they
"proceed by very different routes").
46. L. Soderquist, Securities Regulation 462 (1988).
47. Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Senate Report]. Congress heard of
one instance where Albert H. Wiggin, the chairman of a corporation, and his two broth-
ers made a short-swing profit of $9 million by disposing of their shares before the corpo-
ration announced that it would not pay a dividend and repurchasing the shares after the
price fell. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). The Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce referred to section 16(b) as the "anti-Wiggin provision."
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Report]; see
also Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 457 ("The most fundamental mistake [in enacting section
16(b)] was Congress' emotional reaction to the Great Crash.").
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (preamble to section 16(b)); see supra note 7 for the
entire provision.
49. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Secs. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243
(1976) ("In § 16(b) Congress sought to 'curb the evils of insider trading [by] ... taking
the profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to
be intolerably great.' ") (quoting Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S.
418, 422 (1972)); see also 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1040-44 (2d ed. 1961) (Con-
gress sought to deter insider trading with section 16(b)). But see Dooley, supra note 8, at
56-59 (Congress' main concern was to supplement section 9, which deals with manipula-
tion, not insider trading).
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risk of misusing inside information. Accordingly, section 16 only applies
to the directors, officers, and greater-than-ten-percent stockholders of
companies registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act.5 Second, Con-
gress assumed that in many instances an insider's attempt to profit from
the misuse of inside information would occur through off-setting transac-
tions within a six-month period.5' Therefore, section 16(b) insiders are
liable for the profit realized from short-swing transactions, that is,
purchasing and selling, or selling and purchasing, any equity security of
the issuer within a six-month period.
Most importantly, Congress concluded that imposing strict liability
upon these specified insiders for this narrow range of trades was the only
effective way to deter insider trading.52 As the draftsman of section 16(b)
explained: "You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expec-
tation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be abso-
lutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation,
and you have to have this crude rule of thumb .... In order to create
an in terrorem effect, Congress rejected a requirement of showing the
actual use of information, even where no wrong was apparent, in favor of
a highly mechanical approach. Thus, section 16(b) insiders are liable for
short-swing trading whether or not they have access to inside informa-
tion or act upon it when trading, and regardless of whether they have any
intention, upon making a purchase or sale, of making a later purchase or
sale within six months.5 4 Consequently, section 16(b) is routinely de-
scribed as: "'flat,' 'arbitrary,' 'sweeping,' 'strict,' 'objective' and
50. Section 12 requires the registration of companies that have their securities listed
on national securities exchanges. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988). Section 12 also requires
registration of companies that have assets in excess of five million dollars and a class of
equity securities held by 500 or more record holders. See id. § 781(g)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (1989).
51. For an extensive analysis of the reasoning behind the establishment of the six-
month period, see Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.) (six-month
trading prohibition minimizes misuse of confidential information without discouraging
long-term investment), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Comment, Section 16(b): An
Alternative Approach to the Six-Month Limitation Period, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 1289 (1973).
52. As one commentator notes: "With the exception of an issuer's liability for a false
registration statement and the responsibility for selling securities in violation of the 1933
Act's registration provisions, all remedies other than section 16(b) impose liability only if
the defendant had some degree of fault." Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209, 367 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
53. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on Senate Res. 56 and 97 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934) (statement of Thomas
G. Corcoran) [hereinafter 1934 Senate Hearings].
54. Courts do not recognize equitable defenses to section 16(b) such as waiver and
estoppel by the corporation. See, eg., Texas Int'l Airlines v. National Airlines, 714 F.2d
533, 537 (5th Cir. 1983) (equitable defenses would "thwart the remedial purpose of the
statute"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d
843, 846 (2d Cir.) ("language and purpose of the statute preclude an estoppel"), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,455, at 98,276 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 1984).
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'prophylactic.' "
In enacting the strict six-month trading restriction, Congress at-
tempted to establish minimum fiduciary standards for section 16(b) insid-
ers by removing the temptation to seek short-swing profits and to
manipulate corporate events. 6 In accordance with these fiduciary duty
notions, section 16(b) requires the insider to disgorge short-swing profits
to the corporation. Congress explained: "[Section 16(b)] is simply an
application of an old principle of the law that if you are an agent and you
profit by inside information concerning the affairs of your principal, your
profits go to your principal."57
Congress enacted two other provisions as part of the section 16
scheme.5 8 Section 16(a) requires section 16 insiders to file public reports
listing their holdings of equity securities of their companies and their
transactions in such securities. 9 Congress adopted section 16(a) for two
reasons. First, Congress believed that "the most potent weapon against
the abuse of inside information is full and prompt publicity."'  Second,
section 16(a) reports allow public investors to review insiders' purchases
and sales for suggestions of the insider's private opinions about the com-
pany's future.61 Congress also enacted section 16(c), 62 which makes it
unlawful for section 16 insiders to engage in short-selling or sales against
55. R. Clark, supra note 18, at 295 (quoting adjectives used by courts and
commentators).
56. See Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1092.
57. Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934)
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388
comment c (1958) (an agent is under duty to give to principal profits made in connection
with transactions conducted on principal's behalf). Some states allow a corporation to
recover from an inside trader based on agency principles similar to those used under
section 16(b). See, e.g., In re Orfa Sees. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987)
(derivative claim based on insider trading states a cause of action under New Jersey law);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 504, 248 N.E.2d 910, 916, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 86
(1969) (derivative action under New York law is the "only effective remedy" against
insider trading not covered by federal law). But see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196
(7th Cir. 1978) (Diamond decision "an example of judicial securities regulation"; no de-
rivative suit under Indiana law); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 747 (Fla. 1975) (no
derivative suit under Florida law).
58. Congress enacted two other section 16 subsections in 1964 when section 12(g), 15
U.S.C. § 781(g) (1988), was added to the 1934 Act to extend registration requirements to
the over-the-counter market: section 16(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(d) (1988), exempting mar-
ket-making activity from 16(b) and 16(c); and section 16(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(e) (1988),
exempting arbitrage transactions unless otherwise covered by SEC rules.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). Section 16(a) requires section 16 insiders to file an
initial report of their holdings of equity securities of the issuer on Form 3. Section 16
insiders must file Form 4 within ten days of the end of the month in which they have
transactions in the securities. The SEC publishes the results of these reports in a monthly
pamphlet entitled Official Summary of Securities Transactions and Holdings. The SEC
has proposed several changes in the rules promulgated under section 16(a). See infra
notes 269-273 and accompanying text.
60. 1934 House Report, supra note 47, at 13.
61. See id. at 24.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988).
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the box in their company's equity securities.63 This restriction prevents
insiders from "in effect betting against the performance of their own
company."" In contrast to section 16(b), sections 16(a) and 16(c) have
been relatively noncontroversial.65
As soon as Congress enacted section 16(b) in 1934, commentators be-
gan criticizing the provision:
The six months' test bears no relationship, to the evil sought to be rem-
edied; it is a bed of Procrustes into which it is sought to fit proper and
improper transactions. While it is of course difficult to establish in any
particular case whether or not inside information has been made use
of, nevertheless, the difficulties in applying such a test of liability are no
justification for imposing an artificial test of liability which bears no
true relation to the evil sought to be remedied.
6 6
In 1941, the criticism of section 16(b) prompted a major campaign for
its repeal. Representatives of the securities industry argued that section
16(b) was "neither logical nor effective in preventing a dishonest person
from taking advantage of his position."'67 The securities industry main-
tained that section 16(b) did not effectively deter insider trading because
the provision did not cover individual purchases or sales based upon in-
side information.6 Another criticism stressed that section 16(b) arbi-
63. A section 16(b) insider sells short by selling a security he does not own; an insider
sells against the box when he does not deliver a security that he has sold within "twenty
days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit it in the mails or other
usual channels of transportation." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988).
64. Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1098.
65. See id. at 1097.
66. Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1934).
67. Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 4344, H.R. 5065, H.R. 5832 Before House Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1248 (1941) (statement of George
P. Rea, President of New York Curb Exchange) [hereinafter 1941 Hearings]. In addition
to the above reasons, the industry representatives argued that the repeal of section 16(b)
would enhance market liquidity because section 16(b) insiders could purchase the corpo-
rations' stock when the demand for the stock declined. See L. Loss, supra note 48, at
1088-89. But see Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 485 (section 16(b)'s importance to markets
does not justify its maintenance in view of its exorbitant cost and the existence of other
regulatory provisions in the federal scheme). This Article does not take the position that
the market liquidity argument is a proper reason to repeal section 16(b).
Industry representatives also argued that the corporation was not the proper party to
receive the profits disgorged from short-swing trading because the corporation does not
suffer any harm. See 1941 Hearings, supra at 1254-62; see also Ishizumi, supra note 8, at
455-56 (agency theory does not support corporation's right to receive the "illegally ac-
quired fruit"). But see L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1089 n.214 (corporation, for lack of
alternatives, is proper party to recover; moreover, section 16(b) does not preclude buyers
and sellers from recovering under other statutes). This Article adopts the position that
insider trading does harm the corporation; thus the corporation is the proper party to
compensate if the goal of compensation does not conflict with the goal of deterrence.
However, because this Article assumes that deterrence is the primary goal of insider trad-
ing, it is irrelevant who brings suit or who receives the disgorged profits. See infra notes
326-328 and accompanying text.
68. See 1941 Hearings, supra note 67, at 1248.
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trarily imposed liability upon legitimate transactions that occurred
within six months, but did not prevent trades based upon the actual mis-
use of inside information that occurred six months and one day apart. 9
One representative summed up the repeal effort by declaring: "This part
of the law has, in truth, burned down the barn in order to kill the rats."70
The securities industry, however, did not offer alternative legislation. Its
representatives stated that efforts to draft a substitute provision had
failed, and resolved that it was not possible to draft exact regulations to
deal with the insider trading problem.7 The opponents of section 16(b)
took the extreme position that the expansion of section 16(a)'s filing re-
quirements and section 16(c)'s prohibition of short sales would suffi-
ciently deter insider trading.72
The 1941 repeal effort failed. Congress apparently agreed with the
SEC's reasons for opposing section 16(b)'s repeal: "It is, indeed, a curi-
ous argument that, because the statute does not cover all possible evils, it
should be repealed, even though it does reach the most vicious and usual
form of that evil."73 The SEC also emphasized the value of section
16(b)'s minimum fiduciary standards: "speculation in their [corpora-
tion's] securities by corporate management is in itself a deleterious prac-
tice. Corporate officials then tend to serve two masters-their
corporations and, on the side, their pocketbooks."'74
At the time of the first repeal campaign in 1941, there was no case law
interpreting section 16(b).75 In the early 1940s, the courts strictly inter-
preted section 16(b) under what later become known as the "objective
approach. '7 6 Under the objective approach, courts mechanically applied
section 16(b) to any exchange of shares that vaguely resembled a
purchase or sale, without regard to whether the imposition of liability
would further the purposes of the statute.77 These courts asserted that
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1249.
71. See id. at 1252 ("Principally because of the intangible nature of the offense against
which the law is directed, the old problem of trying to legislate honesty into a man, it has
proven impossible satisfactorily to write an exact prohibition.").
72. See id.
73. Id. at 1255 (statement of Commissioner Purcell).
74. Id. at 1260.
75. See id. at 1253-54 (noting one suit filed at time of 1941 hearings).
76. In 1943, Judge Clark stated: "It is apparent.., from the language of § 16(b)
itself, as well as from the Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which its framers
deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability based upon an objective
measure of proof." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
77. This approach is clearly illustrated in Park & Tilford Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Therein, Judge Clark stated:
We think a conversion of preferred into common stock followed by a sale within
six months is a "purchase and sale" within the statutory language of
§ 16(b).... Defendants did not own the common stock in question before they
exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired
the stock, within the meaning of the [1934] Act.
Id. at 987.
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"arbitrary and sweeping coverage was deemed necessary to insure the
optimum prophylactic effect.""8 In the 1950s, however, courts began to
express concern over the "purposeless harshness"7 9 of an unquestioning
application of the "crude rule of thumb"8 0 as more situations arose in-
volving unorthodox transactions that Congress could not have antici-
pated would come within section 16(b)'s reach."1 To alleviate this overly
strict application of section 16(b), courts developed the "pragmatic ap-
proach," blurring the once clear lines of section 16(b) by "inquir[ing]
whether the transaction... serve[d] as a vehicle for the evil which Con-
gress sought to prevent." 2 Under this approach, courts restricted the
application of section 16(b) in some cases involving unorthodox transac-
tions by inquiring whether there was a possibility for the speculative
abuse of inside information. 3 The pragmatic approach has caused a
great deal of uncertainty and many inconsistencies in the application of
section 16(b). s4 As a result, there is much confusion concerning the defi-
nitions of some of section 16(b)'s basic terms such as "purchase" and
",sale.",8 5
78. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (quoting Ber-
shad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1979)).
79. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
80. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 6557.
81. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 521 (2d Cir. 1966) (conversion of preferred
stock into common stock did not involve the possibility for speculative abuse), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954) (stock
conversion a "sale" covered by section 16(b)).
82. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973);
see also Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958) (first articulation of
pragmatic approach), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
83. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 519-20.
84. See, e.g., Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 55 (1975) ("[W]hat had been originally intended to provide
the courts with a self-determining, mechanical formula has emerged into but an analyti-
cal starting point for judicially created doctrines of liability."); see also 3B H. Bloomen-
thai, Securities and Federal Corporate Law 10.04(3)(b), at 10-22 (1989) ("After
interpreting Section 16(b) liberally for several years as a remedial statute, the courts, and
particularly the Supreme Court, have eroded much of 16(b) away . . . ."); Note, An
Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 402 (statute "modified beyond recognition by judicial
interpretation").
For an extensive discussion of the confusion produced by the two approaches, see
Deitz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 Fordham L.
Rev. 1 (1974) (noting confusion when section 16(b) is applied to mergers, stock options,
convertible securities, puts and calls); Tomlinson, Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of
Purchases and Sales-Merging the Objective and Pragmatic Analyses, 1981 Duke L.J. 941
(dissimilar approaches to similar fact situations by different courts have left numerous
insiders liable for transactions they could not have known were covered by section 16(b));
Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 221 (1975) (pragmatic approach prevents un-
fair results).
85. See Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1103-12.
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2. Rule lOb-5's More Refined Approach
During the early 1960s, when courts frequently restricted section
16(b)'s reach under the pragmatic approach, the SEC found an opportu-
nity to use Rule 10b-5 to combat insider trading. Unlike section 16(b),
which explicitly addresses insider trading, Rule lob-S is a general an-
tifraud provision. 6 In 1961, the SEC announced in an administrative
proceeding that Rule 10b-5 prohibited trading based upon material non-
public information."7 The SEC held that liability under Rule lOb-5 is
conditioned upon a finding that the person trading upon nonpublic infor-
mation had a duty either to disclose the information before trading or to
abstain from trading.8 As originally formulated, this "disclose-or-ab-
stain" duty prohibited anyone from trading based on material nonpublic
information. 9 The SEC imposed this comprehensive duty based upon
the theory that investor confidence in the stock market depends upon the
belief that everyone has the same access to information when trading.90
Thus, in contrast with Congress' limited definition of insiders in section
16, the SEC's definition under Rule lOb-5 reached an extensive array of
insiders. Further, unlike section 16(b) which imposes strict liability,
Rule 10b-5 liability depends upon the insider's acting with scienter 91
when trading based upon material9" nonpublic information.
In 1964, when the SEC first began to use Rule lOb-5 to combat insider
trading, representatives of the securities industry launched another cam-
paign to repeal section 16(b) as part of a bill proposing significant amend-
ments to the federal securities laws. These representatives advised
Congress that section 16(b) "ha[d] aroused strong feelings, and there
86. In 1942, the SEC adopted Rule lOb-5 using its authority under section 10(b), to
prohibit any misstatement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. See L. Loss, supra note 44, at 726-27 (history behind the promulga-
tion of Rule lOb-5).
87. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
88. See id. at 911 ("[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. [If disclosure would be] im-
proper or unrealistic [the insider must] forego the transaction.").
89. See id. at 912.
90. The SEC stated:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principle elements; first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
91. The Supreme Court has held that scienter is a requirement under Rule lOb-5 in
both SEC and private actions. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976). Lower courts have held that reckless-
ness satisfies the scienter requirement. See, e.g., lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d
Cir. 1980).
92. See infra notes 247-253 and 334-335 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the materiality standard under Rule lOb-5.
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ha[d] been a persistent demand for its revision or repeal."'9 3 In addition
to the reasons given in 1941, the representatives asserted that the prag-
matic approach had caused considerable confusion in the application of
section 16(b).94 This repeal effort failed, however, because a congres-
sional committee concluded: "Basically we had no desire to see our vital
legislative program [the 1964 amendments] impeded in any way by a pre-
sumably long drawn out, bitter, and often technical controversy over var-
ious aspects of section 16." 9
In 1968, the Second Circuit firmly established Rule lOb-5 as a compre-
hensive means to regulate insider trading in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 96
by approving the SEC's formulation of the disclose-or-abstain rule. At
this stage, Rule lOb-5 applied to every situation in which section 16(b)
imposed liability. Thus, a dual system of regulation clearly governed sec-
tion 16 insiders: section 16(b) automatically applied to purchases and
sales within a six-month period, while Rule lOb-5 applied to trading with
scienter based upon material nonpublic information.
Although the two prior repeal campaigns had failed, many commenta-
tors continued to call for the repeal of section 16(b). They argued that
the development of insider regulation under Rule lOb-5 had rendered
section 16(b) obsolete: "Prior to 1968, when lOb-5's utility was uncer-
tain, the desirability of extending section 16(b)'s coverage as far as was
statutorily permissible was evident; but with lOb-5's development, the
abolition of or at least a more narrow approach to 16(b) may well be
called for."97
93. Part 2 Investor Protection: Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1201 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Hearings].
94. See id. at 1203-04. The special study conducted in connection with the amend-
ments reviewed the issue of whether the legislature should statutorily reverse the
Supreme Court's decision in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). See 1964 Hearings,
supra note 93, at 1201. In this case, the Court addressed whether a partnership, Lehman
Brothers, had "deputized" one of its partners to sit on a corporation's board of directors.
The partnership had profited from short-swing transactions in the corporation's stock.
The Court held that the partnership would have to disgorge its short-swing profits if the
plaintiff could fulfill its burden of proving the partnership had deputized the partner to sit
on the corporation's board on behalf of the partnership. See Lehman, 368 U.S. at 411; see
also Wagner, Deputization Under Section 16(b): The Implications of Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corporation, 78 Yale L.J. 1151 (1969) (analysis of deputization issue).
95. 1964 Hearings, supra note 93, at 1201.
96. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (the duty to disclose-or-abstain is "based in
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading
on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information."), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (citation omitted).
97. Hazen, supra note 84, at 3; see also Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in
Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 45, 64 (1968) ("The logical extension of
... the arguments.., would be the advocacy of the repeal of section 16(b)."); cf. Note,
Split Sale Schemes Under Section 16(b): Additional Justification for the Supreme Court
Majority's Approach in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 45 Temp. L.Q. 501,
516 (1972) ("[N]early all loopholes in Section 16(b) can be plugged by the liberal ap-
proach taken by the courts in applying Rule lOb-5.").
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In 1973, the American Law Institute ("ALI") also questioned whether
section 16(b) regulation was necessary. The ALI noted as the most im-
portant reason for the repeal of section 16(b): "[T]he jurisprudence that
has developed under Rule lOb-5 ... has rendered obsolete the concept of
automatic recapture of certain short-term profits of certain insiders."" s
The ALI concluded, however, that "[section] 16(b) has a symbolic signif-
icance that must be, and deserves to be, recognized."99 Therefore, the
ALI favored retaining section 16(b), while allowing the SEC to promul-
gate rules to "smooth[] some of [its] rough edges." 10
The ALI did not explain what it meant by section 16(b)'s "symbolic
significance," and many have criticized this rationale.1"1 Professors Jen-
nings and Marsh argue that "the function of Section 16(b) would appear
to be to impose unjust liability upon entirely innocent persons," but nev-
ertheless, the ALI was "told by the Reporter [of the Federal Securities
Code] that no discussion would be permitted of the policy of Section
16(b); it had to be accepted as sacred.""1 2 Another commentator re-
marked: "[s]uch a 'symbolic significance' does not deserve to be main-
tained at such exorbitant cost, especially in view of the fact that the
federal securities regulation scheme now has, in addition to section
16(a)'s filing requirements and section 16(c)'s prohibition against short
sales, rule lOb-5's antifraud provisions." 103
Beginning in 1972, the Supreme Court limited the application of sec-
tion 16(b) in a series of three decisions. Although the Court alternated
between using the objective and pragmatic approaches, it consistently
moved toward a narrower reach of section 16(b). As the three cases
demonstrate, when a literal interpretation of section 16(b) excluded the
transaction, the Court used the objective approach to find that the provi-
sion did not apply to the transaction. When a literal interpretation in-
cluded the transaction, however, the Court focused upon the purposes of
section 16(b) under the pragmatic approach to find that the transaction
did not involve the opportunity for the speculative abuse of inside
information.
In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., °4 the Court first used
the objective approach and held that a greater-than-ten-percent beneficial
owner could reduce his section 16(b) liability by splitting a sale transac-
tion into two steps. In the first step, an insider could sell enough stock to
98. 2 ALI, Fed. See. Code § 1714 commentary at 751 (1980). The ALI listed several
other grounds for repealing section 16(b): "(a) that [section 16(b)] is needlessly arbitrary
to the point of being quixotic; (b) that it has acted as a trap for the unwary; [and] (c) that
the Commission has made insufficient use of its exemptive authority." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For the author's examination of section 16(b)'s symbolic significance in an era of
insider trading scandals, see infra notes 247-285 and accompanying text.
102. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1402 (1987).
103. Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 485.
104. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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reduce his beneficial ownership below the ten percent threshold;'05 sec-
tion 16(b) would apply to disgorge the profits from this sale. After the
seller reduced his ownership below ten percent, he was no longer a sec-
tion 16(b) insider. Therefore, in the second step, the seller could sell his
remaining stock without being liable for the additional profit under sec-
tion 16(b).10 6
A year later, in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.,107 the Court turned to the pragmatic approach to narrow the
reach of section 16(b). The Court rejected the objective approach's lit-
eral interpretation of section 16(b): "[W]here alternative constructions
of the terms of [section] 16(b) are possible, those terms are to be given the
construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-
swing speculation by corporation insiders."' 0 In this case, Occidental
acquired over ten percent of Kern in a hostile battle for control. In order
to avoid a takeover by Occidental, Kern entered into a friendly merger
with Tenneco. Occidental exchanged its Kern shares for Tenneco shares
pursuant to the merger. 10 9 Occidental's exchange of Kern shares for
Tenneco shares occurred within six months of the purchase of the Kern
shares. Thus, the issue arose whether the exchange was a section 16(b)
sale that would make Occidental strictly liable for the profits. Using the
pragmatic approach, the Court held that there was no section 16(b) sale:
"[T]he involuntary nature of Occidental's exchange, when coupled with
the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information,
convinces us that [section] 16(b) should not apply to transactions such as
this one." 110
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co. "' again limited the application of section 16(b) by strictly
interpreting the provision. In that case, Provident sold its assets to Fore-
most in exchange for over ten percent of Foremost's securities. 112 Pursu-
ant to the parties' agreement, Provident quickly sold the Foremost
securities. The Court considered whether the purchase making Provi-
dent a greater-than-ten-percent owner of Foremost was a section 16(b)
purchase.' '3 Interpreting the statute literally, the Court held that this
exchange was not covered by section 16(b). In restricting the application
of section 16(b), the Court noted that other remedies for insider trading
were available:
105. In the first step beneficial ownership was reduced from 13.2 percent to 9.96 per-
cent. Fourteen days later the remaining shares were sold. See id. at 420.
106. See id. at 423.
107. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
108. Id. at 595 (quoting Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418,
424 (1972)).
109. See id. at 588.
110. Id. at 600.
111. 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
112. See id. at 235-36.
113. See id. at 237.
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Section 16(b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by whether alternative
sanctions might inhibit the abuse of inside information. Congress,
however, has left some problems of the abuse of inside information to
other remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordinary inves-
tors are unprotected against actual abuses of inside information in
transactions not covered by [section] 16(b). 14
Carrying the Court's reasoning to its furthest extent, section 16(b) would
appear to be unnecessary, because at this stage Rule lOb-5 regulation
clearly overlapped with that of section 16(b).115 The Supreme Court par-
tially undercut this reasoning in 1980 when it severely limited the scope
of Rule lOb-5's application to insider trading.1 16
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United StatesI 7 rejected
the theory that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 imposed a comprehensive
duty to disclose material nonpublic information before trading.118 In-
stead, the Court held that the only persons subject to the disclose-or-
abstain rule are those with a preexisting fiduciary relationship to the cor-
poration in whose shares the person trades.119 Three years later in Dirks
v. SEC, 2' the Court reaffirmed these principles by applying the fiduciary
114. Id. at 255. In Foremost, the Court also noted: "Rule lob-5 has been held to
embrace evils that Foremost urges its [broad] construction of [section] 16(b) is necessary
to prevent." Id. at 255 n.29. But see Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S.
418, 435 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he protection [section] 16(b) affords is as
necessary today as it was when the statute was enacted.").
115. Cf. R. Hamilton, Corporations 1022 (3d ed. 1986) ("If the [Foremost] Court is
right that in-and-out trading should be controlled by rule lOb-5 wherever possible, isn't
section 16(b) really unnecessary?").
116. See id.
117. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
118. See id. at 235. The Court reversed the criminal conviction of Chiarella, a finan-
cial printer who deciphered the printing codes used to hide the target's identity in an
upcoming takeover.
119. The Supreme Court stated: "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondis-
closure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose
under [section] 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market infor-
mation." Id. The Court also noted that "the duty to disclose arises when one party has
information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between them.'" Id. at 228 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
120. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The defendant Dirks, a securities analyst, received informa-
tion of fraudulent activity within Equity Funding of America from a former officer of the
corporation. See id. at 649. After an extensive investigation and efforts to persuade the
SEC to investigate the fraud, Dirks advised his clients to sell their shares in the corpora-
tion. See id. The Supreme Court reversed the SEC's censure of Dirks for tipping inside
information to his clients. Dirks set forth the following two-part test for tippee liability
under Rule lOb-5. First, it is necessary to show that when the insider communicated the
inside information to the tippee, the insider did so for an improper purpose breaching the
insider's fiduciary duty. See id. at 660. The improper purpose test questions whether the
insider will receive a personal gain, either directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. See
id. at 662. Second, the tippee must know or should have known that the insider's com-
munication was both improper and in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the insider to
his corporation. See id. at 666. The Court held that Dirks did not violate this test be-
cause the insider who disclosed the information to Dirks had not done so for an improper
purpose in breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation. See id. at 665; see
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duty analysis to the situation in which a person tips information to an-
other person who trades. In Dirks, the Court disclaimed the broader
theory that investor confidence in the stock market depends upon the
belief that everyone has the same access to information. 121 The Court
maintained that this theory "could have an inhibiting influence on the
role of market analysts" '122 who are "necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market." 123 Analysts promote the stock market's efficiency by
closely following the prices of stocks and exploiting any opportunity to
make a profit from temporary deviations of market prices from prices
that reflect all of the publicly available information. 24 Thus, the Court
emphasized that a duty to disclose inside information when trading arises
from a preexisting fiduciary relationship, taking a "macroeconomic, free-
market perspective [that] elevate[d] market efficiency over the risk of in-
jury to individual investors."1 25
The fiduciary duty analysis in Chiarella and Dirks left significant gaps
in Rule 10b-5's regulation of the total range of trades based upon inside
information. For the most part, however, Rule 10b-5 regulation contin-
ued to overlap with that of section 16(b). Two groups of section 16(b)
insiders, directors and officers of section 12 companies, clearly owe fidu-
ciary duties to their corporations; thus, they have the duty to disclose or
abstain from trading under Chiarella. In addition, another group of sec-
tion 16(b) insiders, greater-than-ten-percent stockholders of section 12
companies whose holdings are sufficient to constitute control, have fidu-
ciary obligations to their corporations.1 2 6 After the Chiarella decision,
also SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (person who overhears
information not liable as tippee); Cox, supra note 19, at 632 (criticizing Dirks Court's
personal benefit test because analysts further market efficiency whether tipper benefits or
not).
The Dirks Court also noted that some outsiders such as accountants and lawyers may
become temporary insiders. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n. 14; see also SEC v. Lund, 570 F.
Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (director of one corporation became temporary insider of
another corporation after learning confidential information in connection with a joint
venture).
121. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58.
122. Id. at 658.
123. Id.
124. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev.
549, 568-69 (1984). An efficient market is one that reflects all available knowledge about
a company in the price of the company's securities. See J. Cox, Financial Information,
Accounting, and the Law: Cases and Materials 183-88 (1980); Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 8
(1982); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regula-
tion of the Securities Industry, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1035-40 (1977).
125. Rule lob-5 Task Force, supra note 26, at 225; see also Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation,
87 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 624-27 (1988) (courts restrict insider trading regulation to enhance
market efficiency).
126. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 72. Professor Langevoort notes:
Corporate law has over the last few decades begun to impose fiduciary obliga-
tions of fairness and loyalty on persons who are in a position to control corpo-
rate activity as a result of their stock ownership, even though they may not
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however, Rule lOb-5 did not apply to a small group of noncontrolling
stockholders holding more than ten percent of the stock of section 12
companies, because noncontrolling stockholders do not owe fiduciary du-
ties to the other stockholders.127 Rule lOb-5, however, would apply to
such noncontrolling stockholders as tippees.12 s With later developments
in insider trading regulation, a dual system of regulation would again
govern these section 16(b) transactions by noncontrolling share-
holders. 129
Two developments filled the gaps left by Chiarella and Dirks in Rule
lOb-5's regulation of insider trading. First, the SEC enacted Rule 14e-
3130 to combat insider trading in the area that poses the greatest risk of
abuse, tender offers. The SEC based Rule 14e-3 on the theory that the
possession of material nonpublic information about an impending tender
offer, standing alone, gives rise to the duty to disclose the information or
to abstain from trading. In promulgating Rule 14e-3, the SEC acted
under statutory authority other than section 10(b); thus, the Chiarella
Court's restrictions upon Rule lOb-5's regulation of insider trading do
not apply to Rule 14e-3.13
The second development involved the lower court's use of the misap-
propriation theory to expand the reach of Rule lOb-5 under the Chiarella
Court's fiduciary duty analysis.13 2 Under the misappropriation theory,
serve themselves as officers or directors. Since such persons have the same sort
of access to information as a result of their position of power as the typical
officer or director, it makes sense to extend the abstain or disclose obligation to
them as well.
Id. (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947)).
127. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 72 (citing Feldman v. Simkins Industries,
679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982) (14 percent noncontrolling shareholder)).
128. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 73.
129. A noncontrolling shareholder who received nonpublic information from his cor-
poration may owe a duty of trust and confidence to the corporation if the corporation
reveals the information relying upon the shareholder not to use the information for his
own personal use. Cf United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706-08 (S.D.N.Y.) (dis-
cussing reliance test and de facto control tests giving rise to a fiduciary duty), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989).
131. Because it is based on a possession theory, there was some question whether Rule
14e-3 was valid. See O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1179, 1189-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding SEC's authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3);
D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 182 (citing Note, Private Causes of Action Under SEC
Rule 14e-3, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 290, 295-96 (1983)).
132. The misappropriation theory was first discussed by Chief Justice Burger in his
dissent in Chiarella. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that Chiarella traded upon infor-
mation obtained through his employment. He then indicated that an individual might
breach a duty other than afiduciary duty, such as a duty owed to an employer, by trading
upon inside information. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243-45 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court did not hold Chiarella liable under this theory be-
cause the issue was not presented to the jury. See id. at 236; see also SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (SEC used theory against financial printer who misappropri-
ated information about impending tender offers), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Moss
v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (no private cause of action under
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Rule lOb-5 applies to traders who misuse confidential information in
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to someone other than the corporation
whose shares are traded. For example, Rule lOb-5 would apply if an
employee breaches a fiduciary duty owed to an employer when the em-
ployee misuses the employer's confidential information in order to
trade.133 The misappropriation theory, however, is of questionable valid-
ity, because the Chiarella Court seemed to reject the notion that the
courts should comprehensively apply Rule lOb-5 to ensure investor confi-
dence in the market.13 4
Beginning in 1983, several groups proposed legislation to define insider
trading to replace the judicial development of the law under Rule lOb-
5.135 These groups argued that a legislative definition was necessary to
clarify the law, particularly with respect to the viability of the misappro-
priation theory.136 The groups were unable to reach a consensus on vari-
ous proposals for specific prohibitions of insider trading.137 Congress
rejected these efforts, focusing instead upon deterring insider trading,
which left the courts to continue to define the violation under Rule lOb-
5.138
3. The Development of a Stronger Deterrent to Insider Trading
Prior to 1984, the principal remedies for insider trading under Rule
lOb-5 were an injunction against future violations and disgorgement of
the profit made or loss avoided by the illegal trade. 139 Therefore, an in-
misappropriation theory), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1981) (criminal liability possible if employee breaches fiduci-
ary duty to employer by misappropriating employer's information and trading based
upon it), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
133. The lower courts have found that a wide variety of fiduciary duties can give rise to
Rule lob-5 liability. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 718 (S.D.N.Y.)
(son owes duty to father not to trade upon confidential information father discloses to
son), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Hiler, The Judiciary
Considers the Nature of Confidential Relationships in Insider Trading Cases-A Look at
United States v. Reed, 13 Sec. Reg. L.J. 128 (1985).
134. See Rule 10b-5 Task Force, supra note 26, at 236-37 (noting the "troublesome
nature" of the misappropriation theory and its tension with the Supreme Court's perspec-
tive in Chiarella).
135. Senator D'Amato, chairman of the Senate Securities Subcommittee, drafted a
provision which would penalize a trader "if he employs the information in violation of his
own fiduciary or contractual obligations, or if to his knowledge the information is im-
parted to him in violation of the fiduciary or contractual obligations of the person im-
parting such information to him." The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearing
on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984). Milton Freeman drafted a counter-
proposal. See id. at 81-83.
136. See id. at 1-2.
137. 130 Cong. Rec. 20,105-09 (1984) (Senator D'Amato stopped efforts to draft a
legislative definition in order to allow the treble damages provision to pass).
138. See H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2274, 2286 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 House Report].
139. Class actions provided a great deal of deterrence following the Second Circuit's
decision in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
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sider had little to lose under Rule lOb-5 as these sanctions merely moved
the insider back to the position he would have been in had he not traded.
In 1984 Congress enacted ITSA,"4° shifting the focus of Rule lOb-5 regu-
lation to the deterrence of insider trading through stiffer penalties.141
Two factors prompted Congress to adopt ITSA: the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the changes in Rule lOb-5 regulation under Chiarella and Dirks
and the increasing detection of insider trading.' 4z ITSA authorized the
SEC to seek, and a federal court in its discretion to impose, civil penalties
on insiders of up to "three times the profit gained or loss avoided"'' 43 as a
result of insider trading.
Although Congress declined to enact a legislative definition in 1984,
efforts to replace the judicial development of insider trading regulation
under Rule lOb-5 continued. 1" Some of the demand for a legislative
1974). In Shapiro, the Second Circuit held that the insiders were liable to all those who
traded in the open market at the same time as the insiders for the loss in value of the
security after the inside information became public. See id. at 238-41. This in terrorem
effect was eliminated in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980),
when the Second Circuit stated that such "[d]raconian, exorbitant damages, [were] out of
all proportion to the wrong committed." Id. at 170. The Elkind court held that the
insiders were liable for the plaintiffs' losses, but limited the amount recoverable to the
amount of the insider's gain or losses avoided from insider trading. See id. at 172.
140. See supra note 4. For an extensive analysis of ITSA, see Langevoort, The Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and its Effect on Existing Law, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1273
(1984); Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 Duke L.J. 960; Comment, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984: Did Congress and the SEC Go Home Too Early?, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 497
(1986); Note, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law:
Ramifications of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20 Val. U.L. Rev. 575 (1986);
Note, The Role of Treble Damages in Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Deter Insider
Trading, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1069 (1984).
141. The legislative history states that ITSA's purpose is to "provide a sufficient deter-
rent so that people will think twice before they engage in what all of us would call thiev-
ery." Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 559
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of
Representative Wirth, Chairman of Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce).
142. See id.; Silver, supra note 140, at 966-67.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2) (1988) (§ 78u-l(a) was amended by ITSFEA in 1988 to
apply to controlling persons). ITSA does not contain specific criteria to determine the
amount of profits to be recovered, stating the amount shall be determined "in light of the
facts and circumstances." Id. Only the SEC can seek the treble damage penalties under
Rule 14e-3 and Rule lOb-5; private parties cannot seek such relief. The SEC has not
provided any guidelines for when it will seek such a penalty, although it requests this
remedy in almost all insider trading cases. See Levine, Mathews & Callcott, Current
Developments Affecting Insider Trading Enforcement Actions and Litigation, 1988-89,
ALI-ABA Course Materials 3, 79 (1989).
144. Several groups made proposals for a legislative definition. See S. 1380, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S. 8247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987) (bill submitted by
Senators Riegle and D'Amato); Definition of Insider Trading (Part II): Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm on Banking Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-56, 84-90 (Aug. 7, 1987) (SEC and New York Stock
Exchange's Legal Advisory Committee submitted proposals); Rule 10b-5 Task Force,
supra note 26. Efforts were made to reconcile the various drafts. See Securities and Ex-
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definition abated 4 ' in 1987, when an evenly-divided Supreme Court af-
firmed without opinion the use of the misappropriation theory in Carpen-
ter v. United States.1" In Carpenter, a writer for the "Heard it on the
Street" column in the Wall Street Journal tipped the contents of unpub-
lished articles to friends. 47 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's de-
cision upholding the writer's criminal conviction for insider trading
based upon the misappropriation of confidential information in breach of
the writer's duty to his employer. After Carpenter's narrow affirmance of
the use of the misappropriation theory, many argued that a legislative
definition was still necessary. 48 In 1988, Congress again declined to
adopt such a definition, 49 although it is likely that Congress will con-
sider the issue in the near future.150
While Rule lOb-5's application to the insider trading problem may be
unclear in some instances, it is not necessary to address these issues here.
In most cases, the dual system of insider trading regulation applies to
section 16(b) insiders.1 51 After Congress enacted ITSA, however, this
dual system of regulation is no longer justified because the Rule lOb-5
change Commission Proposed Insider Trading Bill (Nov. 18, 1987), reprinted in SEC
Compromise Proposal on Insider Trading Legislation; Accompanying Letter, and Analy-
sis by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27,
1987); see also Symposium: Defining "Insider Trading" 39 Ala. L. Rev. 337 (1988) (ex-
tensive analysis of these proposals).
145. See, e.g., D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 385 ("Some of the impetus for legisla-
tion clearly was lost as a result of the Court's failure to strike down the [misappropria-
tion] theory .... "); Phillips, New Insider Trading Legislation, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 14, 1988,
at 17, col. 1 (100th Congress' interest in definition dissipated after Carpenter).
146. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
147. The information in Carpenter involved market information, that is, information
not produced by the corporation. The Court found that although the Wall Street Journal
did not use any information obtained from the companies, the prices of the securities
discussed in the articles were often affected once the article was published. The Journal
had a policy not to reveal the identities of the companies until the articles were published.
See Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
148. See, e.g., Cox, Choices: Paving the Road Toward a "Definition" of Insider Trad-
ing, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 381, 394 (1988) (arguing that "Chiarella's emphasis on the necessity
of a fiduciary relationship is the linchpin in the current drive toward defining insider
trading"); Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies, Anom-
alies and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 399,
405 (1988) (same); Pitt, Winans Case: The Limits of Securities Law, Legal Times, Nov.
23, 1987, at 18, col. 1 (Carpenter "exposes the SEC to potential difficulties in future
prosecutions of alleged insider trading, at least in the absence of any clarifying
legislation").
149. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 11 ("[T]he court-drawn parameters of
insider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider
trading cases, and ... a statutory definition could potentially be narrowing, and in an
unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law.").
150. The legislative history acknowledges: "The Committee did not believe that the
lack of consensus over the proper delineation of an insider trading definition should im-
pede progress on the needed enforcement reforms ... ." 1988 House Report, supra note
4, at 11; see also 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17129 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (Senator Proxmire
urging reintroduction of bill providing insider trading definition).
151. See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text. A dual system of regulation may
not cover the purchases and sales of noncontrolling greater-than-ten-percent stockholders
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regime and section 16(b) now seek to achieve the same regulatory goal,
the deterrence of insider trading. With developments under ITSFEA,
the Rule lOb-5 regime clearly provides a more powerful deterrent than
section 16(b).
a. ITSFEA
In 1988, Congress unanimously approved ITSFEA, 152 demonstrating
the strong support for a significant increase in insider trading deter-
rence.1 53  Congress provided control person liability, express private
rights of action, and bounties for informants in order to promote the
detection and successful prosecution of insider trading.154 Congress also
enhanced deterrence by increasing the criminal penalties for insider trad-
ing violations.155
The most significant provision under ITSFEA provides for the imposi-
tion of penalties upon "controlling persons" who fail to take steps to
prevent insider trading. 5 6 In 1984, Congress specifically declined to im-
to the extent that the misappropriation theory is invalid and the inside information does
not pertain to tender offers.
152. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 11 ("Despite the stiffer penalties enacted
by Congress in 1984, the last few years have seen a dramatic increase in insider trading
cases, including cases against some of the most prominent officials in Wall Street invest-
ment banking firms.").
153. The House passed ITSFEA on September 13, 1988, by a 410-0 vote. The Senate
then passed the bill without opposition by a voice vote on October 21, 1988. See Kaswell,
An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
45 Bus. Law. 145, 151 (1989). Thus, no Senate or Conference committee reports accom-
panied the act. The President signed the bill on November 19, 1988. See Romano &
Flannery, Insider Trading Laws Tougher, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 39, col. 4 ("The
Senate's last minute substitution of the House bill for its own bill was apparently
prompted by the legislators' desire to enact a law before the term ended . . . ."); Eisen-
berg, After Decade of Effort, Legislators Still Can't Rule the Stock Market, Legal Times,
Nov. 28, 1988, at 14, col. 1 ("In contrast to the six-year effort to define insider trading,
the bill to increase the penalties seemed to come out of nowhere and proceed with blazing
speed."); see also Kaswell, supra, at 145-56 (political process leading up to enactment of
ITSFEA).
154. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 16-23.
155. Congress enacted two other provisions under ITSFEA. First, Congress author-
ized the SEC to conduct an extensive study of the federal securities laws. The SEC has
made only two such studies in the history of the federal securities laws. Section 16(b)
could fall under one of the categories listed for examination, "the extent of 'improper
trading' while in possession of insider information." Smith, Another SEC Study-Is it
Needed? Is It Enough?, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1989, at 5, col. 2. Second, Congress authorized
the SEC to assist foreign governments in insider trading investigations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(a)(2) (1988). In deciding whether to provide such assistance the SEC is instructed
to consider whether the foreign government seeking assistance provides reciprocal assist-
ance and whether compliance would prejudice the public interest. See id.
156. Cf. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 397-98 (3d ed. 1986) (if penalties are
sufficiently high, corporations will respond by taking internal corrective action to prevent
agent's misconduct); Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribu-
tion, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1160-61 (1983) (goal of deterring
corporate crime can be achieved by "[t]hreats of punishment directed at corporations
[which] are intended to catalyze the adoption of sound policies of compliance").
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plement such a provision. 57 By 1988, however, Congress perceived the
need to use control person liability provisions to create an incentive for
private enforcement of insider trading regulation: a"'
The Committee intends through the broadening of controlling person
civil penalty liability to increase the economic incentives for such per-
sons to supervise vigorously their employees. Effective supervision of
securities firms of their employees and agents is a foundation of the
federal regulatory scheme of investor protection. With respect to in-
sider trading in particular, the necessity for appropriate supervision to
prevent violations is evident in view of the special opportunities for
abuse in this area. 1
59
In order to avoid liability under the control person provisions, many
companies establish internal surveillance systems to police their employ-
ees for insider trading violations. 6
In determining who is a controlling person under ITSFEA, the draft-
ers directed the courts to look to the case law under section 20(a) of the
1934 Act.161 ITSFEA's legislative history notes that" '[c]ontrolling per-
son' may include not only employers, but any person with [the] power to
influence or control the direction or the management, policies, or activi-
ties of another person.""16 Directors, officers, and controlling sharehold-
ers usually fall under this definition;163 thus, section 16 insiders may have
the responsibility to prevent insider trading under ITSFEA.
The SEC can seek, and a federal court can impose, civil penalties upon
controlling persons up to "the greater of $1,000,000, or three times the
amount of the profit gained or loss avoided [by the controlled person] as
a result of [the] violation."" 6 In order for a court to grant such relief,
157. ITSA expressly provided that the civil penalty could not be imposed upon con-
trolling persons under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act and upon employers under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1984) (repealed by
ITSFEA on November 19, 1988).
158. See H. Bloomenthal, Emerging Trends in Securities Law § 5.09, at 5-25 (1989).
159. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 17.
160. See, eg., S. Winer & P. Butler, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988 and Expansion of Control Person Liability 42-43 (1989) (one of
the primary factors in determining recklessness will be whether internal controls appro-
priately safeguarded against insider trading); Romano & Flannery, supra note 153, at 32
(absence of internal policies may evidence reckless conduct); Requirements of Insider
Trading Act Go Beyond Securities Firms, Lynch Says, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 65
(1989) (Gary Lynch stated: "[T]here could be a case where the mere fact that a firm
failed to establish any policies and procedures whatsoever would be deemed to be reckless
conduct."). ITSFEA specifically imposes liability upon broker-dealers who knowingly or
recklessly fail to establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or procedure necessary to
maintain an adequate system of supervision and internal controls to detect securities law
violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988).
161. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 17.
162. Id.
163. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 213-14; Goelzer, Liability for Insider Trad-
ing After the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 1989 ALI-
ABA Course Materials 629, 638.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). "'[P]rofit gained' or 'loss
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the SEC must show that the controlling person either "knew or was reck-
less in disregarding the indications that its controlled person was engag-
ing in insider trading or tipping." '65 Contemporaneous traders can sue
controlling persons for the profit gained or loss avoided by the insider
unless the controlling person "acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action."'
166
ITSFEA also establishes an express private right of action for persons
who traded contemporaneously with a person who violated the insider
trading laws.167 The House Committee endorsed the misappropriation
theory:
[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is
specifically intended to overturn court cases which have precluded re-
covery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon
the misappropriation theory .... The Committee believes that this
result is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act,
and that the misappropriation theory fulfills appropriate regulatory
objectives in determining when communicating or trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information is unlawful.
168
Without full congressional support, however, the House Committee's ap-
proval of the misappropriation theory does not resolve the issue of the
theory's validity.6
9
avoided' is the difference between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value
of that security as measured by the trading price of the security a reasonable period after
public dissemination of the nonpublic information." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(f) (1988). This
penalty does not apply to insider trading violations involving face-to-face transactions. If
the insider trading violation involves tipping, control person liability is limited to the
aggregate of direct tippees' profits gained or losses avoided. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3)
(1988).
165. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 18.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988). ITSFEA expressly provided that the newly-created
liability of controlling persons was subject to this pre-existing good faith defense. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(3) (1988). The controlling person would have the burden of establish-
ing the defense. Some courts construe this good faith defense as proving a lack of reck-
lessness. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 960 (5th Cir. 1981);
Carpenter v. Harris Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979). Other circuits have required a "culpable participation" standard. See, e.g.,
Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1987); Kersh v. General Assemblies of
God, 804 F.2d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1986).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988). ITSFEA does not define "contemporaneously."
168. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 26-27 (citations omitted).
169. See id. at 10. In addition to contemporaneous traders, the Committee indicated
that other private plaintiffs may have standing to sue if they can prove injury. See 1988
House Report, supra note 4, at 28. More specifically, the legislative history indicates that
a corporation that alleges that insider trading forced it to pay more for a target company
may have standing to sue insiders. The legislative history referred to one "prominent"
non-contemporaneous trader suit where an acquiring company was found to have stand-
ing to sue a tipper because the tipping caused the price of the target stock to increase. See
1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 28 (citing Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Thayer, No. 85-
079 (N.D. Tex. 1986)); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86-
6447 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1986). But see FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242, 251
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Private parties are limited to recovering the profit gained or loss
avoided by the insider's violation. In addition, any penalties that the in-
sider pays to the SEC will reduce the amount contemporaneous traders
can recover.
170
Congress also enacted a provision authorizing the SEC to reward in-
formants with a bounty of up to ten percent of the insider trading profits
recovered.171 The SEC has the sole discretion to determine when to
award a bounty and its amount. 172
ITSFEA increased the criminal penalties under the 1934 Act from
$100,000 to $1,000,000 for natural persons, and from $500,000 to
$2,500,000 for entities.1 73 Congress also raised the maximum prison sen-
tence from five to ten years with the expectation that judges will impose
longer sentences for insider trading.174 Beginning in 1988, several insider
trading cases resulted in criminal prosecutions, 175 shifting the focus in
insider trading enforcement from civil to criminal sanctions to deter in-
sider trading. As this shift occurs, the line between criminal and civil
prosecutions begins to blur; the only requirement necessary to convert a
civil action into a criminal violation is to prove that the insider acted
willfully instead of merely recklessly.'76 One court has interpreted "will-
fully" as some "realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a
wrongful act.., and that the knowingly wrongful act involved a signifi-
cant risk of effecting the violation that occurred."
' 177
b. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes and RICO
In addition to the changes brought by ITSFEA, a review of the histori-
cal development of insider trading regulation would not be complete
without discussing the recent developments under the mail and wire
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (corporation has no standing to sue), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F2d
981 (7th Cir. 1988). See generally Note, Insider Trading and the Corporate Acquirer
Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5 Against Agents Who Trade on Misappropriated Infor-
mation, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 600 (1988) (arguing acquiring company has a private
claim for damages under Rule lOb-5 against person who misappropriates and trades upon
takeover information from acquirer).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(2) (1988).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1988).
172. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 22.
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
174. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 23; see also 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17219
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (remarks of Senator Heinz) ("Those who violate the securities
laws from inside the board rooms and trading rooms must learn that they will also spend
time inside our jail rooms.").
175. See, e.g., Levine, Mathews & Callcott, supra note 143, at 3 (citing cases). Prior to
1984, criminal prosecutions under Rule 1Ob-5 were rare. See Insider Trading Sanctions
and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1983).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1988).
177. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing lower court
judge's charge to the jury) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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fraud statutes17 and RICO.'79 Securities violations and mail and wire
fraud violations may serve as predicate acts to establish a pattern of rack-
eteering activity under RICO.' s0 The government's ability to prosecute
insider trading was substantially enhanced by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Carpenter. In that case, the Court unanimously held that confi-
dential business information was a form of protected property under the
mail and wire fraud statutes, and that these statutes prohibit the misap-
propriation of such property.1 ' In 1988, the Department of Justice be-
gan to use RICO against accused inside traders,18 2 and it is likely that the
government will use RICO more often to prosecute insider trading." 3
Although direct enforcement of the mail and wire fraud statutes is
confined to criminal prosecutions brought by the United States, the Car-
penter decision will also have an impact on private causes of action for
insider trading under RICO.'1 4 Private parties can use mail and wire
fraud violations as predicate acts in establishing a pattern of racketeer-
ing, 185 and receive treble damages upon a showing that the violation
caused injury to the plaintiff's "business or property."18 6 These develop-
ments will significantly influence the potential violator's deterrence
calculus; combining the treble profit penalty under ITSA and the treble
damages award under RICO with the disgorgement remedy under Rule
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
179. See id. §§ 1961-1968.
180. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1985) ("pattern of rack-
eteering activity" can be satisfied by as few as two violations, neither of which need have
resulted in a conviction or any enforcement action by a public agency).
181. Carpenter's holding with regard to the mail and wire fraud issue was surprising
after the Supreme Court's holding in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
In McNally, the Court held that "schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to
honest and impartial government" were not covered by the mail and wire fraud statutes.
See id. at 2879. In Carpenter, the Court limited the McNally decision as dealing with
services, intangible rights that are too "ethereal" to fall within the scope of the mail and
wire fraud statutes. See Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320. For a critical analysis of the mail
and wire fraud aspects of the Carpenter decision, see Coffee, Hushl: The Criminal Status
of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of
Overcriminalization, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 121 (1988) (Carpenter "historically un-
sound"); Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The Redefinition of the Mail
Fraud Statute, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181 (1988) (Carpenter and McNally demonstrate
difficulties in using mail fraud statute against insider trading violations).
182. For a discussion of criminal RICO, see United States Department of Justice,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): A Manual for Federal Prosecu-
tors (1985).
183. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 236; Levine, Mathews & Callcott, supra note
143, at 3; Brodsky, Practical Effects of Ruling by Supreme Court in 'Winans', N.Y.L.J,
Dec. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
184. For a discussion of civil RICO and securities law violations, see Note, Application
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Viola-
tions, 8 J. Corp. L. 411 (1983).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (making it a crime to conduct or participate in the
conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (standing for any person injured in his business or
property).
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10b-5 may lead to a penalty seven times the profit gained or loss avoided
by insider trading.
The historical development of the dual system of insider trading regu-
lation demonstrates that when Congress enacted section 16(b)'s rather
unusual regulatory mechanism in 1934, it believed that most insider trad-
ing practices involved short-swing transactions within six months, and
that a mechanical approach was the only effective means to prevent these
practices. This historical perspective also reveals that section 16(b) has
survived despite heavy attacks for over fifty-five years. Professor Loss
believes: "By now the section's very longevity has increased its life ex-
pectancy." '187 No other country, however, has effective comparable regu-
lation, and several countries have rejected this "example of 'native
American radicalism.' "188 More importantly, the issue of the repeal of
section 16(b) took on new dimensions in 1984 and 1988, when Congress
enhanced the deterrence of insider trading regulation under the Rule
lOb-5 regime. In 1987, an ABA Task Force examined whether section
16(b) still served a useful purpose. 189 The next section of this Article
critically examines the Task Force's rationales for retaining section
16(b).
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE TASK FORCE IN FAVOR OF RETAINING
SECTION 16(b)
In 1987, an ABA Task Force addressed the question: "Given the de-
velopment of the insider trading doctrine under rule lOb-5, the substan-
tial limitations of section 16(b) in preventing insider trading, and the
hardships that it imposes, is the statute needed?"' 90 The Task Force con-
187. L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1089.
188. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to
'Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats,' 52 Cornell L.Q. 69, 70-71 (1966). The
statute was considered "too radical for Castro's Cuba." Id. at 71. Japan, however, does
have a section 16(b)-type statute, but there has never been a suit under the provision. See
id.
189. See Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13. The Task Force conducted its exam-
ination of section 16(b) in conjunction with a two-part review of insider trading regula-
tion. For its report on insider trading regulation under Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3, see
supra note 26.
190. Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1092. The Task Force recognized
criticism "that section 16(b) is ineffectual in preventing insider trading and does not even
address all the ways in which insider trades can be perpetuated, while it imposes punitive
liability on the innocent, the naive, and the unaware corporate officers who unwittingly
sell in violation of, for example, the labyrinthine restrictions of rule 16b-3." Id. at 1091-
92.
The Task Force proposed many changes in the structure of sections 16(a) and 16(b),
including a suggestion that section 16 insiders file section 16(a) Form 4 reports within
two days of any purchase or disposition. The Task Force also recommended the follow-
ing changes, among others, in section 16(b): decreasing the short-swing period from six
months to three months; providing definitions for "beneficial ownership," "officers," and
"directors;" applying section 16(b) to equity securities other than those of the issuer;
excluding certain unorthodox transactions from section 16(b); and permitting former
shareholders of an acquired company to sue under section 16(b). See id. at 1092-93.
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cluded that section 16 still serves important public policy purposes by
removing the temptation for corporate officers to manipulate corporate
events, removing the temptation to profit from short-term price fluctua-
tions, and penalizing the use of inside information, particularly soft infor-
mation. 191 This section examines whether these purposes are valid, and
whether ITSFEA's control person provisions would achieve these goals
more efficiently. In addition, this section considers whether section 16(b)
continues to have "symbolic significance" in the war against insider trad-
ing because the insider trading scandals may have shaken investors' con-
fidence in the stock market.
A. The Temptation to Manipulate Corporate Events and
to Seek Short-Swing Profits
The Task Force maintained that section 16(b) establishes "minimum
standards of fiduciary conduct" 192 by reducing the incentives for corpo-
rate managers to manipulate corporate events and to seek short-swing
profits. 193 Some commentators have praised section 16(b)'s fiduciary
standards: "Congress has written a rule of conduct for corporate man-
agement more effective than management could have written for itself
and devised a more effective means of enforcing it." '194 In 1988, however,
Congress authorized substantial penalties for controlling persons who
recklessly disregard insider trading violations in order to encourage cor-
porations to implement internal compliance systems to police their em-
ployees for insider trading violations.195 Congress, in effect, now requires
corporations to write their own rules of fiduciary conduct to prevent in-
sider trading. Given this development, the question arises: if Congress
repealed section 16(b), would corporations replace section 16(b)'s six-
month trading restriction with more effective and efficient internal corpo-
rate rules to eliminate the temptation for corporate managers to seek
short-swing profits and to manipulate corporate events?
To answer this question, it is first necessary to analyze whether the
control person provisions are efficient. As noted previously, the govern-
ment imposes minimum fiduciary standards to decrease the agency costs
involved in the divergence between the interests of shareholders and
manager.s. 196 In determining whether an externally-imposed fiduciary
standard is efficient, it is important to consider whether the external reg-
ulation approximates the internal corporate rules that shareholders and
managers would devise if the parties could contract without significant
191. See id. at 1092 (citation omitted).
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Woodside, Resume of the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets and
the Commission's Legislative Proposals, 19 Bus. Law. 463, 478 (1964).
195. See supra notes 156-166 and accompanying text.
196. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 780.
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transaction costs. 197 Thus, with respect to the control person provisions,
it is necessary to examine whether managers and shareholders would find
it in their self-interest to bargain for internal controls to reduce the
agency costs created by insider trading. 19 Prior to 1988, however, most
corporations did not take affirmative steps to discourage their managers
from engaging in insider trading.' 99 Accordingly, the possible reasons
why shareholders and managers did not privately contract to implement
self-policing systems must be analyzed. This examination reveals that
control person liability is an efficient regulatory solution, because signifi-
cant transaction costs prevent managers and shareholders from bargain-
ing for self-policing systems to reduce the agency costs that arise from
insider trading.
1. Efficiency of Control Person Liability
As discussed earlier, insider trading causes social harm by generating
agency costs because shareholders lose some of their ability to motivate
managements' behavior through compensation incentives.2°° Investors
cannot determine which firms have higher agency costs because they can-
not detect insider trading. As a result, investors will discount the value
of each firm's stock by the average agency costs for all firms;2"1 this dis-
counting process will raise the cost of capital for all firms. Because man-
agement's compensation often is tied to the value of their firm's
securities, managers have an opportunity to increase their compensation
by lowering their firm's cost of capital. Managers could lower their
firm's cost of capital by incurring "bonding costs""2 2 to signal to the
197. This principle is derived from Coase's Theorem which provides a law and eco-
nomics analysis for choosing legal rules. Under the Coase Theorem, in the absence of
transaction costs, parties will bargain for an efficient outcome regardless of the legal rule.
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960). If there are positive
transaction costs, parties may not be able to bargain to achieve an efficient result. In the
presence of such costs, the government, in establishing legal rules, should attempt to
approximate the result that private parties would reach if they could contract without
significant transaction costs. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 156, at 46; see also Ander-
son, supra note 38, at 781 ("Just as contract and warranty law and consumer protection
legislation can promote both efficiency and fairness by providing standardized rules for
transactions with high contracting and monitoring costs, corporation codes can perform
a similar function by providing standardized rules to govern shareholder-management
relations.").
198. Cf Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 865 ("[The] prohibition [of insider trad-
ing] could be justified only if it were clear that the parties themselves had attempted to
deter insider trading by contract and that the government had a comparative advantage
in enforcing such contracts.").
199. See id. at 861-66; Dooley, supra note 8, at 45-46. But see Pitt & Shapiro, The
Revised Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1988: A Legislative Remedy for a Problem
that Persists, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 7, 39 (1988) (prior to ITSFEA, majority of control-
ling persons already cognizant of their obligations to prevent insider trading).
200. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
202. Sellers incur bonding costs to establish better quality under conditions of uncer-
tainty. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 44-45. Commentators use the term bonding costs,
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market that their firms have reduced the possibility of insider trading.
These bonding costs would include the types of internal controls that
Congress seeks to encourage firms to implement under the control person
provisions.
In deciding whether to incur bonding costs, managers would compare
the returns available from insider trading to the returns available from
indirectly increasing their compensation by improving the value of their
firm's securities.2 °3 Calculation of the returns from investing in self-po-
licing systems would focus upon the short-term rewards such systems
would provide to enhance the managers' compensation packages, 2° and
would not take into account the long-term benefits that such systems
would provide to the corporation's shareholders. Given managements'
short-term perspective, the high returns available from insider trading
might overshadow any compensation benefits it would receive from im-
plementing internal controls.
Managers who do not engage in insider trading would still profit from
incurring bonding costs. However, social and psychological barriers
within corporations make it doubtful that those managers who do not
engage in insider trading would force their will upon those managers
who might lose substantial profits from insider trading.205 Consequently,
it is unlikely that managers would find it in their self-interest to establish
self-policing systems voluntarily, because the returns from insider trading
would probably exceed the managers' returns from implementing such
systems.
Although it is unlikely that managers would voluntarily incur bonding
costs, shareholders would still find it in their self-interest to reduce the
agency costs caused by insider trading. Therefore, it is necessary to de-
termine why, in the past, shareholders have been unable to contract pri-
vately with managers to establish internal controls to prevent insider
trading. Some commentators have argued that shareholders did not at-
tempt to prevent insider trading because the corporation is not harmed
by the practice.20 6 These commentators assert that insider trading regu-
lation as a whole is inefficient, based on the absence of private contracts
those costs incurred by managers to reduce agency costs, to distinguish from the costs
assumed by shareholders to reduce agency costs which are called "monitoring costs."
See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 38, at 323-26.
203. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 38, at 781 (management will not draft contracts
against its own interests); Haft, supra note 19, at 1058 (those who would propose restric-
tions are those who would benefit from insider trading).
204. Management's attention is usually focused on short-term returns that are quickly
reflected in the company's stock prices. The threat of a takeover, in particular, causes
managers to focus on short-term payoffs, even though the stock price may not accurately
reflect the underlying value of the business.
205. See Haft, supra note 19, at 1058. See generally Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48
Law & Contemp. Probs. 83 (1985) (social and psychological barriers within a corporation
make it doubtful that the corporation will voluntarily police itself).
206. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 864-66.
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to control the practice.2"7 Given the high agency costs that insider trad-
ing imposes, however, shareholders can reap substantial gains from em-
ploying internal rules to reduce insider trading.
Professor Dooley explains:
[A]n investor who opposes insider trading might pay ten dollars per
share of X Corporation if he is assured that insiders of X will not trade
on confidential information. Without such assurance, he would pay
only nine dollars per share. If the risk of insider trading could be re-
duced by one-half, the shareholder would value the share at $9.50. As-
suming that active monitoring can reduce the incidence of insider
trading, a rational shareholder would incur [costs] ... as long as [these
costs] increase[ ] the marginal value of the share to him.2°s
Thus, shareholders have the incentive to reduce the agency costs of in-
sider trading by bargaining with managers to establish self-policing sys-
tems. Shareholders would find it in their self-interest to allot to
managers a portion of the returns from reducing the agency costs of in-
sider trading to persuade managers to implement self-policing systems.
Managers, however, would find it in their self-interest to agree to such a
bargain only if the additional compensation offered by shareholders was
sufficient to offset the returns from insider trading. Consequently, one
explanation for the absence of private contracting for internal controls is
that managers have found the rewards from insider trading to be more
attractive than those from such private contracting.
Even if shareholders could offer managers sufficient returns to incur
bonding costs, several factors suggest that such bargaining would not
take place because of free-rider problems209 and high transaction costs.
A shareholder confronts an inherent free-rider problem in contracting
for an internal surveillance system because the shareholder will not real-
ize the entire return from his investment; the passive shareholders receive
a 'free ride' because there is no effective way to prevent them from receiv-
ing a proportionate amount of the benefits.210 Even in the absence of the
free-rider problem, shareholders would be discouraged from bargaining
with managers because managers have a natural advantage over the ne-
gotiation process; managers would be tempted to "manipulate the con-
tract to earn the rewards of apparently complying with its provisions and
at the same time secretly trading outside [their] established compensation
schedule[s]." 2"' Thus, ITSFEA's control person obligations may take
207. See id.
208. Dooley, supra note 8, at 42.
209. Free-rider problems occur when it is difficult or impossible to exclude those per-
sons who have not paid for the use or enjoyment of a public good. See C. Goetz, Cases
and Materials on Law and Economics 28 (1984). For discussion of the free-rider problem
facing shareholders trying to curb managers from self-dealing, see Anderson, supra note
38, at 779; Easterbrook & Fisehel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1168-72 (1981).
210. See Cox, supra note 19, at 655-56.
211. Id. at 657; see also Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privi-
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the place of the bargain that high transaction costs prevent managers and
shareholders from reaching.
Other explanations for why firms took a passive position towards in-
sider trading prior to 1988 do not withstand closer analysis. According
to these explanations, which assume that shareholders could overcome
the difficulties in negotiating with managers, shareholders would not con-
tract to implement self-policing systems for two reasons. First, share-
holders would not benefit from such a contract because there is no need
to supplement public regulation.212 It is unlikely, however, that share-
holders would regard internal controls as superfluous, given the preva-
lence of insider trading and the costs that such trading imposes upon the
managers' agency relationship with the corporation. Second, even if ad-
ditional restrictions are necessary, corporations do not have the capabil-
ity to prevent insider trading;213 public enforcement is probably the only
effective way to enforce the prohibition against insider trading because
public officials can monitor trading through the stock exchanges' com-
puter surveillance systems. 214 This rationale is also seriously flawed.
Corporations could simply contract with the stock exchanges to super-
vise the trading of the firm's securities.2" 5 More importantly, computer-
ized monitoring is not the only means to detect insider trading. As a
review of some of the internal controls adopted under ITSFEA indicates,
corporations may be in a better position than the government to police
for insider trading due to their greater information about the certainty
and costs of enforcement.21 6 In order to avoid control person liability,
corporations will take a variety of steps to supervise the flow of nonpub-
lic information and to deter trading by managers likely to have access to
this information.
2. Devising Internal Rules of Fiduciary Conduct
to Prevent Insider Trading
The control person provisions, in effect, decentralize the process of for-
mulating precise regulations to prevent insider trading. In order to avoid
control person liability, firms will tailor their self-policing systems to
meet their specific risks of insider trading. ITSFEA presumably requires
leges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 334 (despite agreement
to forego inside trading, managers can trade anyway knowing they will probably avoid
detection).
212. See J. Choper, J. Coffee & C. Morris, supra note 20, at 466.
213. Unlike private corporations, public enforcers can also "obtain search warrants,
use grand juries, engage in plea bargaining, obtain bank records from foreign jurisdic-
tions, . . . and employ administrative sanctions (such as suspending a broker dealer)."
Id.; see also Easterbrook, supra note 211, at 333 (corporations lack devices to detect in-
sider trading); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 634 n.224 (high cost of insider
trading monitoring suggests that collective monitoring and enforcement would be most
efficient).
214. See J. Choper, J. Coffee & C. Morris, supra note 20, at 466.
215. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 890.
216. See id.; Dooley, supra note 8, at 46.
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each firm to balance the marginal cost of implementing surveillance pro-
cedures against the marginal benefit of detecting insider trading.217 Each
firm will derive the marginal cost of establishing internal controls from
the total costs of designing, testing, and implementing a self-policing sys-
tem, including the loss of productivity from putting the controls in ef-
fect.2"' Each firm will calculate the marginal benefit of detecting insider
trading from the amount of control person liability the firm avoids, tak-
ing into account the risk that its employees will engage in insider trad-
ing.219 In assessing the risk of insider trading, firms will consider such
factors as the type of nonpublic information involved and the number of
employees that have such information.22
Where the possibility of insider trading is small, corporations will issue
general firm policies against insider trading and restrict access to confi-
dential information.221 Firms that have a higher risk of insider trading
may limit their employees' trading to certain periods following important
public disclosures 222 and may require employees to clear all tradeg
through the general counsel's office. 223 Alternatively, these firms may
employ independent brokers to administer periodic investment programs
so that the timing of purchases and sales of the firm's securities is outside
the control of its employees.224 Some firms may need to go as far as
issuing a flat prohibition against trading in the firm's securities.225 In
addition, firms with a significant risk of insider trading may have the
incentive to disclose nonpublic information earlier than usual in order to
reduce their exposure to control person liability.226
Regardless of the degree of risk a firm faces and the types of internal
217. See S. Winer & P. Butler, supra note 160, at 44; see also Cox, supra note 19, at 639
("[A] firm will balance the marginal cost of each additional unit of bonding, monitoring,
and signaling against the accompanying marginal benefits of reducing its managers' trad-
ing."); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 38, at 345-51 (agency costs involve monitoring
costs incurred because of manager's incentive to exploit outside shareholders). No firm
will be completely free from insider trading because it is too costly to eliminate the prac-
tice entirely.
218. See S. Winer & P. Butler, supra note 160, at 47.
219. See id. at 44.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 47-52.
222. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 309.00, 4 Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,100, at 19,103-04 (1983) (suggesting that an insider may trade
after the firm issues the annual report, quarterly results, proxy statement, or prospectus,
so long as the insider contacts the chief executive officer to ensure that there are no
important undisclosed developments).
223. See S. Winer & P. Butler, supra note 160, at 49.
224. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, supra note 222,
26,100, at 19,103.
225. See S. Winer & P. Butler, supra note 160, at 49.
226. See id. at 50. This incentive may have a healthy effect on the allocative efficiency
of the market as a whole; absent trading by the corporation in its own stock, there is no
affirmative duty to disclose nonpublic information. See generally Bauman, Rule 10b-5
and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935 (1979) (discussing
extent of corporation's duty to disclose material information).
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controls it devises, a firm will need auditing procedures to ensure that its
employees comply with its programs.227 Firms with a high risk of insider
trading will supplement these auditing procedures with a review of their
employees' trading records and tax returns.228 To strengthen the deter-
rence of these self-policing programs, firms will impose sanctions upon
employees who engage in suspicious conduct.229 Internal discipline may
take the form of liquidated damages, discharge, and forfeiture of
benefits.230
A firm that fails to self-police for insider trading will face a substantial
penalty for each insider trading violation by its employees. Therefore,
the next issue to address is who will ultimately bear the penalty imposed
under the control person provisions.23' Investors will discount the value
of each firm's securities to counterbalance the firm's risk of control per-
son liability.232 As a result, investors are not harmed when the firm in-
curs the control person penalty, because they will receive a higher rate of
return to compensate for this risk. Thus, the penalty falls upon firms
rather than investors; firms that fail to self-police will have a higher cost
of capital.233 Firms will attempt to lower their cost of capital by signal-
ing to the market that they have decreased their potential exposure by
implementing effective internal compliance systems.234
In sum, control person liability is an efficient regulatory solution be-
cause it approximates the bargain that shareholders and managers would
reach if they could contract without significant transaction costs. Firms
that fail to establish such systems will have a higher cost of capital be-
cause investors will demand a higher rate of return to compensate for the
risk of control person liability. This analysis provides the groundwork to
examine whether, assuming Congress repealed section 16(b), section 12
companies would substitute section 16(b)'s six-month trading restriction
with more efficient internal rules.
3. Replacing Section 16(b)'s Rule of Conduct
Section 16(b) is an extremely rough approximation of the agreement
that shareholders and managers of section 12 companies would reach if
they could contract without significant transaction costs; the six-month
227. See S. Winer & P. Butler, supra note 160, at 50-51.
228. See id. at 57; Carlton & Fisehel, supra note 28, at 864.
229. See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick': An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 408 (1981); Fisse, supra note
156, at 1161.
230. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 864; Dooley, supra note 8, at 46.
231. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 229, at 409 (discussing who should bear the penalty);
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Reg-
ulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 430-34 (1963) (same).
232. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 31, at 477-78 (firms experiencing insider trading have
higher cost of capital).
233. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 135; Frankel, Implied Rights of Ac-
tion, 67 Va. L. Rev. 553, 577 (1981).
234. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 46-48.
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trading restriction is necessarily overinclusive for some companies and
underinclusive for others. Although section 16(b)'s "crude rule of
thumb" is a poor substitute for private contracting, some may argue that
the short-swing trading rule is necessary because section 16(b) insiders
pose a high risk of abusing their access to confidential information. No
data exists to support this position. Section 12 companies, however, may
experience more financial developments that offer insider trading oppor-
tunities, thus increasing the risk that their insiders will engage in insider
trading.
Section 12 companies will design their self-policing systems taking into
account section 16(b)'s trading restriction on their officers, directors and
greater-than-ten-percent shareholders. Section 12 companies will supple-
ment the six-month trading rule with internal controls to the extent nec-
essary to avoid control person liability. Assuming that section 12
companies have a high risk of insider trading, the repeal of section 16(b)
would create a gap in their surveillance programs. This gap would ex-
pose these companies to potential liability under ITSFEA. As the risk of
control person liability increased, investors in section 12 companies
would insist on a higher return for their investment, which would raise
the cost of capital for section 12 companies. To reduce this cost, section
12 companies would implement more rigorous internal controls to fill the
void left by the repeal of section 16(b).
Allowing section 12 companies to substitute privately section 16(b)'s
externally imposed trading restriction with their own internal corporate
rules would be efficient, because section 12 companies could tailor their
self-policing systems to meet their specific risks of insider trading. The
decentralized system of regulation under the control person provisions
avoids the inefficiencies of section 16(b)'s blunt regulation because firms
have an inherent advantage over the government in formulating internal
corporate rules; corporations have better information than the govern-
ment concerning the risks of insider trading and the costs of preventing
the practice.2 35 As a result, the control person provisions will likely have
a greater impact than section 16(b) upon the internal operations of a firm
in two respects. First, self-policing systems are more likely to increase
managerial efficiency by deterring managers from looking for insider
trading opportunities. Second, these procedures may lead to a greater
reduction of informational delays and manipulation of corporate
events.236
The ability of insiders to manipulate corporate events is most acute
when insiders engage in short-selling. Therefore, section 16(c)'s stan-
dardized restriction against short-selling serves a useful purpose, because
it is likely to correspond to the type of internal controls that firms would
235. See id. at 46.
236. See Haft, supra note 19, at 1051-64. But see Easterbrook, supra note 211, at 333
(firms have reasons other than insider trading for delaying the release of information).
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enact in its absence.237
In sum, under the control person provisions, Congress encourages
firms to write rules of fiduciary conduct to control insider trading that
are more effective than section 16(b). If Congress repealed section 16(b),
firms would substitute the six-month trading restriction with individually
tailored self-policing systems. These internal systems would more effi-
ciently achieve section 16(b)'s most important goals: removing the temp-
tation for managers to seek short-swing profits and to manipulate
corporate events. With this conclusion, it is appropriate to turn to the
Task Force's final rationale for retaining section 16(b).
B. Insider Trading on Soft Information
The Task Force maintained that section 16(b) still serves a valid pur-
pose because:
[Section 16(b)] penalize[s] the unfair use of inside information by insid-
ers. This includes both trading on inside information in violation of
rule lOb-5 and the use of "softer" information of the type that insiders
often have but that members of the investing public do not: the ability
to make better informed guesses as to the success of new products, the
likely results of negotiations, and the real risks of contingencies and
other uncertainties, the underlying facts of which have been publicly
disclosed.238
Apparently, the Task Force was particularly concerned about prevent-
ing section 16(b) insiders from trading upon subjective or future-oriented
information, known as "soft information, ' 239 which is not regulated by
Rule lOb-5. Under Rule lOb-5, a manager can trade upon nonmaterial
soft information. Given that the two systems of insider trading regula-
tion take conflicting approaches, the issue arises whether section 16(b)'s
efforts to prevent insiders from trading upon nonmaterial soft informa-
tion are efficient. The development of disclosure policies pertaining to
soft information provide insight into this issue. This historical perspec-
tive demonstrates that, although Congress strongly disfavored the disclo-
sure of soft information when section 16(b) was enacted in 1934, recently
237. But see Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 893 (shareholders may not contract
to ban short-selling because this type of transaction may convey valuable information
about the firm and induce managers to make better investment decisions).
238. Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1092 (footnote omitted).
239. For more extensive commentary on the many issues posed by soft information,
see Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 75 Va. L. Rev. 723 (1989); Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management
Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1197, 1213 (1987); Hiler,
The SEC and the Courts'Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals,
and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1114 (1987);
Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 Md. L.
Rev. 1071 (1987); Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 254 (1972); Steinberg & Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations-An
Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 Md.
L. Rev. 923 (1987).
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the SEC and the courts have begun to encourage the disclosure of soft
information in order to enhance market efficiency. Further analysis
reveals that management's trading upon nonmaterial soft information is
an efficient means to facilitate the process by which soft information
reaches the stock market.
1. History of the Regulation of Soft Information
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted section
16(b) to prevent insider trading and other securities laws to ensure the
disclosure of factual, verifiable data.2" Because it regarded soft informa-
tion as inherently unreliable, the SEC adopted a paternalistic attitude to
protect unsophisticated investors from managers who might make overly
optimistic projections.241 Thus, the SEC at first prohibited the disclosure
of soft information.24 2 Commentators criticized the SEC's strict posi-
tion, arguing that the free flow of soft information would promote mar-
ket efficiency. 243 Recently, the SEC recognized that "the availability of
forward-looking and analytical information is important to an investor's
assessment of a corporation's future earning power and may be material
to informed investment decision-making." 2" Therefore, the SEC relaxed
its position by permitting or even encouraging managers to disclose soft
information.245 The SEC has not yet gone so far as to require the disclo-
sure of soft information. 2
46
In 1988, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the issue of insider trad-
240. See Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 239, at 937-38.
241. See id. at 934-46.
242. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973). But see
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(requiring disclosure of management's estimate of assets and intended reorganization of
target company).
243. See Dennis, supra note 239, at 1213; Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 239, at
935.
244. Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities
Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756, at
81,036 (Nov. 7, 1978).
245. See Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Eco-
nomic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 80,461, at 86,201-02 (Apr. 23, 1976) (permitting soft information in
1933 Act registrations statements and 1934 Act filings). Rule 175 encourages the disclo-
sure of projected future revenues by providing managers with a safe harbor if the projec-
tions are made upon a reasonable basis and in good faith. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175
(1988); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938-45 (June 25, 1979). See generally
Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 95 (1978)
(discussing potential benefits and liabilities in release of soft information); Note,
Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1525 (1981) (arguing mandatory disclosure of corporate projections will
not further investor protection and could impair market efficiency); Note, The SEC Safe
Harbor for Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direction?, 1980 Duke L.J. 607 (arguing for
refinement of SEC safe harbor rule for disclosure of forecasts).
246. Some commentators argue that the SEC should require the disclosure of soft in-
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ing upon soft information under Rule lOb-5 in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.247
The Basic Court's main concern was whether a bright-line test was ap-
propriate to judge the materiality under Rule lOb-5 of soft information
concerning merger negotiations.24 8 The Court refused to adopt a bright-
line test,24 9 indicating that such a test would not achieve the purpose of
the materiality standard "to filter out essentially useless information that
a reasonable investor would not consider significant ... in making his
investment decision. '  In a footnote, the Basic Court rejected the no-
tion that there was a lower materiality standard for insider trading upon
soft information:251 "[a] fact does not become more material to a share-
holder's decision because it'is withheld by an insider or because an in-
sider might profit by withholding it." '252 The Court, however, indicated
that insider trading upon soft information may serve as "an indication of
materiality. ' 253 Thus, the Court recognized that managers may trade
upon nonmaterial soft information under Rule lob-5.
In addressing another issue in Basic, the Court implicitly recognized
formation to enhance market efficiency. See Dennis, supra note 239, at 1218-21; Stein-
berg & Goldman, supra note 239, at 935.
Although the SEC has not yet mandated the disclosure of soft information, a few
courts do require disclosure of this information in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring that "soft
information such as asset appraisals and projections must be disclosed [when] the re-
ported values are virtually as certain as hard facts"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
247. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
248. In Basic, the New York Stock Exchange called upon corporate officers to confirm
rumors concerning unusual trading in the company's stock. Although the company was
engaged in merger negotiations, the officers responded that they were not aware of any
events that would cause unusual trading. See id. at 981 n.4. In Greenfield v. Heublein,
Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985), the Third Circuit
held that merger negotiations were immaterial as a matter of law until the parties had
reached an agreement on both the price and the structure of the merger. See id. at 756-
57. The SEC refused to adopt the bright-line rule for determining whether preliminary
merger negotiations were material. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No.
22214, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,801, at 87,592 (July 8,
1985).
249. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 985-86. The Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's
bright-line test, which focused upon whether the parties had established the price and
structure of the merger.
250. Id. The Basic Court adopted the standard enunciated in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976): "'[T]here must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.'" Basic,
108 S. Ct. at 983 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
251. In Basic, the Supreme Court rejected the theory raised in SEC v. Geon Industries,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1976), that materiality has a different aspect in insider
trading cases and that information takes on an added charge just because it is inside
information. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988 n.18 (1988). The Court
stated: "We find no authority in the statute, the legislative history, or our previous deci-
sions, for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings the action or
whether insiders are alleged to have profited." Id.
252. Id. (quoting Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227,
1231 (1st Cir. 1984)).
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the link that connects managers' trading upon nonmaterial soft informa-
tion to the efficiency of the stock markets. In Basic, the Court adopted
the "fraud on the market theory," which serves as a presumption of in-
vestor reliance in certifying class actions under Rule l0b-5.2  Under
this theory, investors who never read or relied upon a misstatement can
bring suit under Rule lOb-5 if the misstatement distorted the market
price of the stock. The Court adopted this theory to ensure that the
"market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. '25
The efficient market hypothesis provides the support for the "fraud on
the market theory." The efficient market hypothesis posits that the price
of a stock immediately reflects all available public information about the
company.256 This is so because analysts seek to profit from temporary
deviations in stock prices from prices that reflect all known information
about the company. 257 Thus, the Basic Court's emphasis upon market
efficiency accords with the Dirks Court's earlier recognition that "market
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [analysts'] initiatives to
ferret out and analyze information. 258
This historical perspective demonstrates that the SEC and the
Supreme Court favor the disclosure of soft information to promote mar-
ket efficiency. With this background, it is possible to examine why sec-
tion 16(b)'s goal of preventing managers from trading upon nonmaterial
soft information is inefficient.
2. Repealing Section 16(b) Would Enhance Market Efficiency
The Task Force favored retaining section 16(b) to prevent insiders
from trading upon nonmaterial soft information that was not regulated
by Rule lOb-5. Congress, however, should repeal section 16(b), because
allowing insiders to trade upon nonmaterial information promotes mar-
ket efficiency. In most cases, insider trading upon nonpublic information
simply has too much "noise" associated with it to be an efficient substi-
tute for clear corporate announcements.25 9 Management trading upon
nonmaterial soft information, however, may provide an essential process
254. See id. at 988-90. See generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dis-
pensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L.
Rev. 435 (1984) (arguing fraud on the market theory demands stricter adherence to com-
mon-law reliance requirement).
255. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991 (1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)).
256. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
257. See id.
258. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983). But see Stout, supra note 125, at
615-37 (questioning whether the market efficiency goal of securities regulation is
appropriate).
259. Professor Manne has argued that insider trading has the beneficial effect of pro-
moting smooth stock price changes by slowly adjusting the stock's market price to its
post-disclosure equilibrium price. See H. Manne, supra note 28, at 78-104. But see Gil-
son & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 629-34 (insider trading is a relatively inefficient way
of communicating stock value information to market).
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by which nonmaterial soft information reaches the stock market, enhanc-
ing market efficiency.2"° Two factors impede the disclosure of soft infor-
mation to the market. First, corporations do not have a general
obligation to disclose soft information.26' Second, managers are reluc-
tant to disclose this type of information because they risk massive liabil-
ity if the forecast turns out to be incorrect.262
Allowing managers to trade upon nonmaterial soft information may
provide them with the necessary incentive to disclose indirectly this type
of information to stock market analysts. 263 Although nonmaterial infor-
mation is by definition not relevant to rational investors, 2 " analysts can
piece together several bits of nonmaterial information to produce fore-
casts about the future prices of a company's stock.265 Managers' trading
upon nonmaterial information signals to analysts about the insiders' pri-
vate opinions about the company.266 Efforts by these analysts ensure
that the firm's stock prices reflect the information revealed by insider
trading. Managers may be tempted to manipulate stock prices by giving
analysts false signals; however, once misled, analysts would not continue
to follow such leads.267
Requiring section 16 insiders to file section 16(a) reports on or before
260. Professor Cox explains:
[O]fficers may early in a firm's third quarter possess nonpublic information that
the firm has finally obtained control over the production costs for one of its
many products while wholesale distributors are busy inquiring about two other
product lines. The corporation does not disclose these facts because they are
too tentative. Nevertheless, any investor selling during the period of nondisclo-
sure would certainly benefit by whatever effects knowledge of these events will
have on the market.... Under these circumstances, an unwitting outsider may
welcome the insider's trading if it provided even modest upward propulsion in
the stock's price.
Cox, supra note 19, at 647; see also Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of
Information, 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 475, 484-85 (1986) (noting that management forecasts can
have a similar effect).
261. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
262. See Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 239, at 936-37; see also Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 28, at 868 (firm can disclose information through insider trading that it other-
wise would not for fear of massive liability).
263. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 868. Insider trading upon nonmaterial
information promotes market efficiency because, as studies demonstrate, managers are
more accurate than analysts in making financial forecasts. See Cox, supra note 260, at
481 n.17.
264. See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
265. See Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 127, 140-44 (1984);
Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J.
Legal Stud. 819, 820-21 (1980).
266. See, e.g., Dorfman, Journal Launches Insider Trading Feature, Wall St. J., Aug.
31, 1988, at 28, col. 2 (analysts monitor section 16(a) reports); Koretz, Tracking Corpo-
rate Insiders to Get in on a Good Thing, Bus. Wk., May 19, 1986, at 34 (model portfolio
study following insiders' trades yielded higher than average returns); Marcial, Taking a
Cue from Company Insiders, Bus. Wk., May 12, 1986, at 88 (market drops generally
preceded by heavy insider selling).
267. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 892.
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the day they trade would take into account the market's sensitivity to the
information provided by insider trading upon nonmaterial informa-
tion.268 Prompt section 16(a) reporting would significantly aid the efforts
of analysts to investigate developments giving rise to soft information.269
In addition, such disclosure would better serve the congressional policy
underlying section 16(a) that allows public investors to review insiders'
purchases and sales for suggestions of the insider's opinions about the
company's future.270 In order to ensure that insiders promptly fulfill
their duties to file section 16(a) reports,2 7 1 the SEC should enact its pro-
posed changes in the rules promulgated under section 16(a) that would
impose penalties upon section 16 insiders who fie late.272 Other SEC
proposals would require section 12 companies to disclose annually late
section 16(a) filings. Through public disclosure of late filings, the SEC
seeks to encourage section 12 companies to implement compliance pro-
grams to assist their insiders in filing section 16(a) reports. 273
In conclusion, section 16(b)'s six-month trading restriction imposes
significant costs by deterring activity that would enhance the market's
informational efficiency. Compared to section 16(b)'s flat six-month re-
striction, Rule lOb-5's materiality standard better balances the need to
prevent insider trading against the benefits provided by allowing manag-
ers to trade. Thus, an examination of the Task Force's rationales for
retaining section 16(b) reveals that they are no longer valid in light of
recent developments. In searching for a reason to continue section 16(b)
268. Several commentators and legislators have pushed for such reform in the past.
See, eg., Klein, supra note 9, at 9; Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1102
(noting Senator Chafee's proposal for same-day section 16(a) reports and $50,000 penalty
for late filing). The Section 16(b) Task Force concluded that same day or prior reporting
was not practical and recommended that section 16 insiders file Form 4 reports within
two business days of the transaction. See id. The SEC did not adopt this suggestion in
their proposals to overhaul the rules promulgated under section 16(b). See infra note
268.
269. Cf. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 868 ("The greater the ability of market
participants to identify insider trading, the more information such trading will convey.").
270. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
271. See Cox, supra note 260, at 501 n.77 ("Any linkage of the insider trading practices
with the larger corporate aims of improving voluntary disclosure practices must deal with
the reality that insiders will not comply fully with the detailed restrictions and concomi-
tant record keeping such a linkage necessitates.").
272. See Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Stock-
holders, Exchange Act Release No. 26333, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,343, at 89,626-27 (containing Proposed Item 405 to Regulation S-K, Pro-
posed New Item 7 to Schedule 14A, Proposed New Item 10 to Form 10-K) [hereinafter
Ownership Reports]. The SEC enacted these proposals in response to findings that 48
percent of the section 16(a) reports were filed late in 1986 and 43 percent were filed late in
1988. See id. at 89,625 n.208. In addition, the SEC proposed legislation giving it the
ability to impose a fine for late filings. See id. at 89,626 n.21 1. The SEC submitted pro-
posed legislation and a supporting memorandum to Congress on September 28, 1988 and
January 24, 1989. See 21 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 156-57 (Jan. 27, 1989).
273. See Bagley & Newell, 55 Years Later: Revisions Proposed for Sec. 16, Nat'l L.J.,
July 3, 1989, at 15, col. 1; Companies Urged to Institute Compliance Programs, 4 Corp.
Couns. Wkly. (BNA) No. 25, at 8 (June 21, 1989).
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regulation, the next section of the Article explores whether section 16(b)
has "symbolic significance" in the war against insider trading.
C. Section 16(b)s "Symbolic Significance" in the War
Against Insider Trading
In 1973, the ALI favored retaining section 16(b) because the provision
has "symbolic significance that deserves to be recognized."' 74 Section
16(b) may have symbolic significance in the war against insider trading in
two respects. First, investors may regard section 16(b) as a symbol of
market integrity at a time when insider trading scandals have shaken
their confidence in the stock market.275 Second, Congress may view sec-
tion 16(b) as a political symbol in its efforts to take a tough stance against
insider trading.
In the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, 76 the possibility that in-
vestors attach symbolic significance to section 16(b) is undoubtedly im-
portant. The legislative history of ITSFEA recognizes that one of the
primary goals of insider trading regulation is to "restore the confidence
of the public in the fairness and integrity of our securities markets. ''2 77
Indeed, Congress enacted section 16(b) to renew investor confidence in
the market after the 1929 stock market crash.2 78 Arguments about inves-
tor confidence, however, are difficult to evaluate. No statistical evidence
supports the proposition that insider trading has eroded investor confi-
dence in the market.2 79 Therefore, notions about investor confidence
may lead to overregulation.2 8 0
Assuming that insider trading scandals have shaken investor confi-
dence in the market, one might contend that despite section 16(b)'s ineffi-
274. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
275. As expressed by one commentator:
At a time when investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets has
been rocked by a series of insider trading scandals, it would be a large step
backward to further erode that confidence by repealing a provision that not
only is recognized as a symbol of the fight against improper insider trading, but
also is highly effective in preventing the occurrence of several forms of such
trading.
P. Romeo, Section 16 Treatise § 1.05(2) (to be published in 1990 by Executive Press, Inc.)
(draft on file at Fordham Law Review) (citation omitted).
276. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones average of thirty industrial stocks lost 22.6
percent of their value. See Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, Report of
the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms 1 (1988). One trillion dollars was
lost from the stock market decline during a four-day period beginning October 13, 1987.
See id.
277. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 7.
278. See 1934 Senate Report, supra note 47, at 21; 1934 House Report, supra note 47, at
13; see also Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corporate Infor-
mation by Insiders, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468, 468 (1947) (profit taken by managers on inside
trades often obtained at the stockholders expense prior to enactment of section 16(b)).
279. Cf. Klein, The October 1987 Market Crash, 20th Ann. Inst. on Sec. Reg. 79
(1988) (comprehensive review of the 1987 market crash).
280. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 148, at 382 (investor confidence rationale leads to
overregulation).
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ciency, it is better to leave the matter as it is, rather than resort to repeal.
Such apprehension is unwarranted. As discussed previously, corpora-
tions would replace section 16(b)'s six-month restriction with internal
surveillance systems under ITSFEA. To the extent that the repeal of
section 16(b) would shake investor confidence in section 12 companies,
investors would discount the stock in section 12 companies to compen-
sate for any loss of confidence. In order to reduce their cost of capital,
section 12 companies would implement more rigorous systems of internal
controls to signal to the market that the repeal of section 16(b) did not
affect their ability to prevent insider trading.
Even if retaining section 16(b) would have some small comforting ef-
fect upon the stock market, this comforting effect would be undermined
because business people would continue to be trapped by an archaic law.
These incidents, which are inevitable under section 16(b), will serve to
strengthen the growing perception that insider trading regulation is seri-
ously flawed.2"' Repealing this symbol of mindless formalism would ac-
knowledge that insider trading regulation has advanced to the point that
other weapons in the insider trading arsenal have effectively rendered
section 16(b) obsolete.28 2
Section 16(b) may also have "symbolic significance" in a political
sense. The public's outrage at the recent insider trading scandals may
decrease the political acceptability of repealing section 16(b).28 3 Con-
gress may hesitate to send confusing signals to the public declaring that it
is taking a tough stance on insider trading, while simultaneously repeal-
ing the only provision of the federal securities laws that explicitly ad-
dresses insider trading. Indeed, any suggestion of eliminating one of the
weapons used to combat insider trading is likely to provoke a strong pub-
lic reaction. In the heat of Congress' crusade against insider trading,
however, efficiency interests should not be subordinated to political inter-
ests without sufficient justification.28 4 Given the current political climate
for reform of the insider trading laws, Congress has a "rare opportu-
nity"2 5 to repeal section 16(b)'s anachronistic regulation.
281. See supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
282. One could use the investor confidence rationale to argue that the repeal of section
16(b) may strengthen the public's perceptions of the legitimacy of insider trading regula-
tion and thus, the public's confidence that the markets are being efficiently regulated.
283. For articles addressing how politics have shaped insider trading regulation, see
Gilson, The Political Dimension of Insider Trading, 19 Stan. Law. 34 (Fall 1987) (discuss-
ing how recent insider trading scandals have revived debate whether insider trading
should be legal); Macey, From Courts to Congress: The Politicization of Insider Trading
Regulation, 15 Cornell L.F. 9, 9 (1988) (special-interest groups influenced development of
insider trading laws).
284. See Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 452-55 (moral or political reasons may cause over-
regulation of insider trading).
285. Klein, supra note 9, at 8. In 1983, Mr. Klein advocated the repeal of section
16(b): "It is not often that Congress decides to devote any time to issues of this character.
It seems a shame not to make the most of the opportunity." Id. Fifteen years earlier,
however, one commentator believed that the repeal of section 16(b) was not practical:
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In conclusion, the Task Force's reasons for retaining section 16(b) do
not withstand closer analysis. ITSFEA's control person provisions
would efficiently replace the minimum fiduciary standards embodied in
section 16(b)'s six-month trading restriction. The final goal, which seeks
to penalize insider trading upon nonmaterial soft information, is ineffi-
cient because this goal operates to impede the valuable flow of informa-
tion to the market. Moreover, repealing section 16(b) would symbolize
efforts to enhance the efficiency of insider trading regulation. In order to
assess fully the merits of repealing section 16(b), it is necessary to pro-
ceed to an economic analysis of the deterrence aspects of the dual system
of insider trading regulation.
III. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE WEAPONS IN THE INSIDER
TRADING ARSENAL
This section uses cost-minimization principles to evaluate the effi-
ciency of section 16(b)'s scheme authorizing the "automatic recapture of
certain short-term profits of certain insiders. '2 s6 First this section exam-
ines the tradeoffs that are made in designing an efficient enforcement sys-
tem to deter unlawful activity. Next, this section conducts an economic
analysis of the tradeoffs involved under the Rule lOb-5 and section 16(b)
regimes. This evaluation provides the groundwork for comparing section
16(b)'s method of deterring insider trading with that of the other weap-
ons in the modem arsenal of insider trading enforcement.
A. An Overview of Cost-Minimization Principles
Three tradeoffs are made in developing an efficient deterrence strat-
egy.2 87 The first involves using a general standard or a specific rule to
regulate the proscribed activity. 8 The second tradeoff entails devoting
resources to the detection and prosecution of violations or increasing the
sanction imposed upon violators.2 89 The final tradeoff concerns employ-
ing public versus private resources to enforce the regulation. 9 Choices
made under one tradeoff influence decisions relating to a proper balance
achieved under the other tradeoffs. In addition, the tradeoffs generate a
"Congress has many more pressing and important problems than the fate of one compar-
atively obscure provision of the federal securities laws." Lowenfels, supra note 97, at 64.
286. ALI, supra note 98, at 751 (emphasis in original).
287. See Becker, supra note 8, at 180-85; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1076-79.
288. Professors Ehrlich and Posner were the first to examine in detail how increasing
the specificity of regulation would enhance deterrence. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974); see also Schwartz, supra
note 8, at 1087-91 (discussing per se rule or rule of reason in the antitrust context).
289. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8, at 183-84 (to save resources used to detect viola-
tions, fine should be at maximum level, in order to reduce probability of detection to
minimum level); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880, 883 (1979) (optimal probability of detection
is at lowest level when fine is at highest level).
290. See Frankel, supra note 233, at 578; Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975).
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cost of errors, an important cost of enforcement. The cost of errors in-
cludes resources consumed in prosecuting innocent people and resources
diverted from legitimate activity.291
1. The Specificity-Generality Tradeoff
The degree of specificity with which a regulation is expressed produces
distinct costs and benefits in developing a system of deterrence.2 92 Regu-
lations are more precise as the number of facts that result in legal conse-
quences decreases. 293 To facilitate understanding of the "specificity-
generality continuum," 9 the term "specific rule" describes a law that
precisely details behavior that will produce definite legal outcomes.295
The phrase "general standard" refers to regulation that employs vague
criteria relevant to legal judgments.296
Overall, a specific rule enhances the efficiency of a deterrence strategy
in two ways. First, precise regulations have an impact on the cost side of
the potential violator's risk-reward equation. Because a specific rule em-
ploys very few factual issues to determine whether certain activity is ille-
gal, it increases the likelihood that the defendant's conduct will fall
within its narrow parameters and thus be deemed illegal. In addition,
because a specific rule does not provide for discretionary exceptions, it
also raises the probability that the defendant will be convicted for engag-
ing in the illegal activity.297 Second, a specific rule reduces the amount of
resources the enforcement system consumes in prosecuting violators. A
precise rule promotes deterrence and decreases the number of violations
that occur; thus it lowers the amount of resources required for the detec-
tion of the illegal activity and the total number of cases brought before
the judicial system.298 Specific regulation also conserves judicial re-
sources, because cases concerning a specific rule involve only a few fac-
tual issues that take less time to litigate.2 99 Given only a limited number
of facts to dispute, parties can more accurately predict the outcome of
litigation; thus, a specific rule also increases the likelihood that parties
will settle their disputes outside the court system.3a
Although precisely detailed regulations advance the efficiency of a de-
terrence strategy, they also have several disadvantages which may out-
291. See Stigler, supra note 17, at 528.
292. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 257.
293. See id. at 261.
294. Id. at 257.
295. See id. at 258 ("The simplest kind of rule, then, takes the form: if X, then Y,
where X is a single, simple, determinate fact (e.g., the car's speed) and Y is a definite,
unequivocal legal consequence-a judgment of liability or nonliability-that follows di-
rectly from proof of X (eg., driver has violated traffic code).").
296. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 258.
297. See id. at 264.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 265 (citing Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 423-26 (1973)).
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weigh the benefits if the rule does not accurately categorize the
prohibited conduct. Specific rules tend to be both overinclusive and un-
derinclusive. 0 1 The overinclusive aspects of a specific rule encompass
activity that is not harmful under the regulatory goal. Consequently, this
overinclusiveness raises the cost of errors as a result of prosecuting inno-
cent people" 2 and diverting resources from legitimate conduct.30 3 Be-
cause a specific rule also tends to be underinclusive, it fails to cover
conduct that results in the same harms the regulation seeks to prevent.
A regulatory system can solve the underinclusive aspects of a specific
rule by using a general standard to supplement specific regulation .3 04
The flexibility of the vague criteria used under a general standard pro-
vides enforcement officials with more discretion than does a specific rule.
Under a general standard, enforcement officials can take into account a
wide variety of factors in determining whether a defendant's activity is
harmful. Since more factors are taken into account, a general standard
tends to consume more enforcement resources than does a specific rule.
A general standard, however, produces a lower cost of errors than a spe-
cific rule. A general rule decreases the chance of prosecuting innocent
persons, because enforcement officials have more discretion under a gen-
eral rule's vague criteria to determine whether the defendant's conduct
was illegal. 30 5 The vagueness inherent in a general standard, however,
increases the cost of errors by generating a "chilling effect," causing
some people to forgo legitimate conduct because they are unsure of the
range of permissible activity.30 6
On the whole, a specific rule increases deterrence and saves judicial
resources.3 0 7 These benefits must be weighed against the costs resulting
from a specific rule being both underinclusive and overinclusive. 30 8 By
enhancing deterrence and saving judicial resources, a specific rule influ-
ences the next tradeoff made in designing a deterrence strategy, the cer-
tainty-severity tradeoff.
2. The Certainty-Severity Tradeoff
The second tradeoff made in designing an efficient deterrence strategy
involves the choice between devoting resources to detecting and prose-
301. See id. at 267.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 263-64.
304. See id.
305. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1077. Professor Schwartz states: "The possibility
of error in applying the legal standard to the facts of the case implicates another essential
tradeoff. Process costs designed to reduce the incidence of error must be traded off
against the costs that result from the occurrence of error." Id.
306. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 263.
307. See id. at 275. But see Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1091 (favoring in the antitrust
context a "general standard [which] explicitly stat[es] the governing considerations rather
than a series of per se prohibitions and a focus on completed acts rather than inchoate
conduct").
308. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1082.
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cuting violators or increasing the severity of the potential sanction im-
posed. This certainty-severity tradeoff determines the expected penalty
on the cost side of the equation an insider uses to calculate the risks and
rewards of insider trading. An efficient deterrence strategy would estab-
lish sanctions that equal the expected returns of insider trading, with the
optimal sanction depending upon the probability that an insider will be
detected and convicted. 09 To illustrate, if the probability of detecting
and convicting insider trading was 100 percent, the fine should equal the
profit gained or loss avoided from insider trading. If the probability of
detection and conviction was 10 percent, then the fine should equal ten
times the profit gained or loss avoided by the insider's illegal trade.31 0
An effective enforcement system can deter insider trading either by
increasing the probability of detection and conviction, or by raising the
severity of the potential sanction. 3 " Consequently, an efficient deter-
rence strategy could minimize the costs of enforcement by reducing the
chance of detection and conviction and raising the amount of the sanc-
tion. l2 For example, assume it costs $500,000 to detect 10 percent of the
insider trading violations; if a $10,000 fine is imposed, an insider faces an
expected fine of $1,000. Assume further that enforcement costs could be
reduced from $500,000 to $5,000 by detecting only 1 percent of the in-
sider trading violations. If the resources devoted to detection were re-
duced and the fine was raised from $10,000 to $100,000, the insider
would still face an expected fine of $1,000. These examples are based on
the assumption that insiders are risk-neutral. The conclusion reached,
however, holds true when an insider's attitude toward risk is examined.
An efficient deterrence strategy takes into account an insider's risk-
bearing nature, that is, the amount of utility lost from a decrease in in-
come.313 An insider's attitude toward risk will determine the rate at
which the insider discounts the expected value of the penalty in calculat-
ing the risks and rewards from insider trading. Insiders tend to be risk
averse.3 1 4 Thus, they lose more utility from a decrease in income than
they receive from an equal increase in income.3" As a result, risk averse
309. See R. Clark, supra note 18, at 291.
310. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1467 (1979). Professor Diver notes:
"Mere removal of economic benefit will usually be insufficient by itself to secure compli-
ance with regulatory standards. It is necessary, at least in theory, to multiply the docu-
mented benefit by a factor representing the likelihood of escaping punishment
altogether." Id.
311. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8, at 183-84; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 289, at
881.
312. See A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 74-76 (1983); see also
Block & Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered, 4 J. Legal Stud. 241, 246 (1975)
(fines higher than offender's wealth do not add to deterrence).
313. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 120; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
289, at 881.
314. See K. Elzinga & W. Breitsupra note 8, at 126-29. But see Coffee, supra note 229,
at 395 (empirical evidence shows that typical corporate management is not risk averse).
315. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 120.
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insiders prefer the "large probability of a small loss to the small
probability of a large loss." '316 An efficient penalty structure produces
the least amount of utility for the potential violator. Consequently, the
use of a high fine with a lower probability of detection will more effec-
tively deter risk-averse insiders.317
In designing an efficient penalty structure, it is also necessary to con-
sider a principle known as "marginal deterrence," which posits that the
amount of the penalty should vary with gravity of the act committed. 18
Otherwise, "[if a] thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had
just as well take $5,000.''319 Under the principle of marginal deterrence,
the "[e]xpected penalties [should] increase with expected gains so there is
no net marginal gain from larger offenses. ' 3 ° For example, the penalties
for insider trading should increase to correspond to the marginal benefit
an insider receives from investing more money in illegal trading.321
The cost of errors also must be taken into account in trading off the
certainty of prosecution and the severity of the penalty. 322 Raising the
amount of the penalty magnifies the harm of prosecuting innocent people
and deterring legitimate activity.323 To decrease these errors, the deter-
rence strategy can devote more resources to the enforcement process. An
efficient deterrence system, however, will balance these additional en-
forcement expenditures against the costs generated by error.324
In review, an effective enforcement system can conserve resources in
deterring risk-averse insiders by raising the expected penalty to corre-
spond to the expected gains from insider trading. The deterrence system
must weigh the savings in enforcement resources produced by increasing
the severity of the penalty against the negative affects that this strategy
has on the cost of errors.325 The next tradeoff involves the amount of
resources devoted to enforcement.
316. Id.
317. The opposite conclusion would hold if insiders are risk-preferrers. A risk-prefer-
rer receives more utility from an increase in income than he loses from an equal decrease
in income. Thus, the use of a low fine with a higher probability of detection will deter
more effectively risk-preferring insiders. See id.
318. See Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. Legal Stud. 71,
73-74 (1980); Stigler, supra note 17, at 527.
319. Stigler, supra note 17, at 527.
320. Id. at 531. For the moral perspective of marginal deterrence, see Andenaes, The
Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 649 (1970).
321. Marginal deterrence does not apply if a sufficiently high penalty and low
probability of enforcement deter all inside trading. See Block & Sidak, The Cost of Anti-
trust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Geo. L.J. 1131, 1134-
35 (1980). Another tradeoff made under an efficient deterrence strategy concerns the use
of fines as opposed to imprisonment. See infra notes 368-370 and accompanying text.
322. See Block & Sidak, supra note 321, at 1136-38.
323. See Frankel, supra note 233, at 573.
324. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1077.
325. See id. at 1087 ("The usual argument for a per se rule is that the saving in process
costs resulting from the adoption of the rule exceeds in value whatever adverse conse-
quences occur because of the over-and underinclusiveness of the general prohibition.").
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3. The Private v. Public Enforcement Tradeoff
The final tradeoff made in designing an efficient deterrence strategy
involves the choice between public and private resources to enforce regu-
lations. Assuming the primary goal of insider trading regulation is deter-
rence,3 26 rather than compensation, it is irrelevant who prosecutes
violators or who receives the penalty.3 27 This assumption is sound; there
is no need for compensation if the deterrence strategy is effective.3 28 Ac-
ademicians debate whether public or private enforcement will efficiently
prevent illegal activity,329 but most view public enforcement as more effi-
cient than private enforcement.330 Private parties are motivated by high
damage awards, and thus do not consider the underlying rationale of the
regulation. With private enforcement, every increase in the penalty leads
to more enforcement.331 When public enforcement is used, however, the
penalty can be increased with a corresponding decrease in the probability
of detection and conviction.332
In conclusion, increasing the degree of specificity of the regulations
employed, the amount of the sanction imposed upon violators, and the
level of public resources used for enforcement tends to promote the effi-
ciency of a deterrence strategy. The advantages attained in deterring vio-
lators must be weighed against the corresponding costs of prosecuting
innocent persons and discouraging legitimate conduct. Using these cost-
minimization principles, it is possible to analyze the deterrence strategies
under the Rule lOb-5 and section 16(b) regimes.
B. The Rule 10b-5 Regime
1. The Specificity-Generality Tradeoff
The Rule lOb-5 regime employs several general standards that cause
uncertainty in applying its vague criteria to particular insider trading
cases. Rule lOb-5 liability depends upon finding that an insider breached
a fiduciary duty and that the insider traded upon material inside informa-
tion. Under ITSFEA, control person liability depends upon finding that
the defendant is a control person, and that the control person recklessly
disregarded whether insider trading violations were occurring.
326. See Frankel, supra note 233, at 578; Landes & Posner, supra note 290, at 6.
327. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 66; Kajala, supra note 7, at 642. The
SEC, IRS, and private parties have begun to litigate disputes over the profits disgorged
from insider trading in the courts. See Ostroff, IRS, SEC Fight over Insider Trading
Profits, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 11, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
328. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev.
263, 319 (1981).
329. See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of En-
forcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974); Breit & Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The
New Learning, 28 J. L. & Econ. 405, 413 (1985).
330. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1092.
331. See id.; Breit & Elzinga, supra note 329, at 412.
332. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 116; Landes & Posner, supra note 290,
at 8.
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Under Rule lOb-5, the most significant sources of uncertainty are the
vague criteria used in determining what types of fiduciary duties give rise
to liability. This uncertainty, though significant, does not affect whether
Congress should repeal section 16(b). Although Rule lOb-5's application
to certain traders is unclear, it would apply to most section 16(b) transac-
tions because these transactions involve an insider who owes fiduciary
duties to the preexisting shareholders of section 12 companies.333
Under Rule lOb-5, it must also be shown that the insider traded on
information that was material. To date, most insider trading cases have
involved information that was clearly meaningful to the rational inves-
tor.334 Although the criteria used in determining whether information is
material are vague, the flexibility of the materiality standard provides an
efficient balance between the investors' informational needs and the bene-
fits provided by allowing managers to trade.335
Turning to ITSFEA, the most significant source of uncertainty con-
cerns the criteria for determining who is a "controlling person. '336 Once
again, the outcome of this debate over the uncertainty caused by these
vague standards does not affect the analysis of whether section 16(b)
should be repealed. Most section 16(b) insiders will have a duty to estab-
lish internal controls to police for insider trading337 because directors,
officers, and greater-than-ten-percent shareholders usually have the
"power to influence or control the direction or the management, policies,
or activities of another person. "338
Under ITSFEA, the plaintiff must also establish that the control per-
son was reckless, that is, that the controlling person disregarded
"whether circumstances suggesting employee violations exist. ' 339
Although the recklessness standard will cause some uncertainty, it pro-
vides the benefit of decentralizing the responsibility of designing precise
rules; the recklessness standard requires firms to tailor their self-policing
systems to meet their specific risks of insider trading violations. Impos-
ing a private duty to establish internal rules reduces the enforcement
333. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text. The legislative history's ap-
proval of the misappropriation theory adds some credibility to the notion that Rule 10b-5
applies to the noncontrolling ten percent shareholders of section 12 companies.
334. See Eisenberg, Insider Trading Law: Basic Principles and New Developments,
20th Annual Inst. on Sec. Reg. 107 (1989) (noting SEC has lost one case on materiality
issue). In addition to being material, the information traded upon must also be nonpub-
lic. Before trading, insiders must allow the market a sufficient amount of time to absorb
the new information. The market is deemed to absorb the information when a significant
number of investors have knowledge of the information. Similar to the materiality issue,
whether information is public or not is rarely a problem in most insider trading cases.
See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 141.
335. See supra notes 259-267 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
338. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 17.
339. Id. at 18.
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costs incurred in designing, implementing and enforcing the regulatory
scheme.
The Rule lOb-5 regime's use of general standards in conjunction with
high penalties may enhance deterrence because the general standards
may have an in terrorem effect on potential violators. 3" The lack of clear
boundaries will cause a risk-averse insider to raise the rate used to dis-
count the expected penalty, which will increase the expected cost side of
the insider's profit calculation. Thus, the general standards may save en-
forcement resources by avoiding complex Rule lOb-5 litigation. Because
a risk-averse insider can not accurately predict the amount of the ex-
pected penalty, the insider will have a strong incentive to settle for a
fraction of the penalty to avoid paying the entire penalty. 4 This benefit
is especially important with respect to criminal cases which involve a
higher standard of proof than civil suits.342
An evaluation of the Rule lOb-5 regime's general standards must
weigh these advantages against the disadvantages that the vague criteria
produce by increasing the cost of errors.3 43 Like any general standard,
the absence of precise contours in Rule lOb-5 will deter lawful as well as
unlawful activity.3" Indeed, the vague criteria used under Rule lOb-5
raise the issue whether Rule lOb-5's regulation of insider trading can
meet the constitutional requirement of specificity in the criminal con-
text. 45 As discussed previously, overall, general standards reduce the
cost of errors because the flexibility of the general standards tends to
340. See Silver, supra note 140, at 1000-01 ("[Ihe defendant may be overly en-
couraged to settle the case for an amount less than three times the amount of profit
gained or loss avoided.").
341. See id.
342. See id. at 963.
343. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 14.
344. See Silver, supra note 140, at 1000. Some people will forego legitimate transac-
tions because of the fear of severe sanctions. See Coffee, Too Many White Collar Prosecu-
tions, Wash. Post, June 25, 1989, at B7 col. I (criminal sanctions deter at considerable
cost of "anxiety and insecurity to those in the industry who are now subjected daily to the
threat of severe penalties for even minor transgressions of often vague rules").
345. The General Accounting Office submitted to the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce a
report stating:
A question exists as to whether Congress may be required to specifically define
by statute the behavior constituting "insider trading" if criminal sanctions for
this violation are to be imposed under securities laws. The government's use of
criminal sanctions for insider trading under existing federal securities laws has
been questioned in the courts. At issue, in part, is whether relevant provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can meet the constitutional principle of
"specificity" required of criminal law. Depending on future court decisions, a
more precise definition of the term may be required, if contested criminal sanc-
tions for this violation are to be sustained under the securities laws.
United States General Accounting Office, Securities Regulation: Efforts to Detect, Inves-
tigate, and Deter Insider Trading 58 (1988) (cited in Pitt, Caplan & Mann, Liability for
Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1989 ALI-ABA Course Materials
241, 362-63); see also Arkin, Materiality in Insider Trading Cases, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11,
1988, at 3, col. 1; Federal Criminal Liability Urged for Insider Trading of Securities,
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provide enforcement officials with the discretion to avoid convicting in-
nocent persons. The Rule lOb-5 regime, however, may not produce this
benefit, because the uncertainty of the standards in conjunction with se-
vere penalties may cause too many defendants to settle.346
The need for a legislative definition of insider trading raises the ques-
tion whether such a definition would advance deterrence. One way to
enhance deterrence is to simplify prosecution efforts by lowering the
plaintiff's burden of proof. This would increase the expected value of the
potential penalty to the insider, producing the same effect as raising the
multiplier of the damage award.347 For example, the plaintiff's burden
would decrease if a legislative definition of insider trading provided that a
violation occurs when an insider trades while in the possession of inside
information, rather than based on inside information. 348 By raising the
probability of successfully prosecuting an insider trading violation, such
a definition would have two effects. First, the higher probability would
cause an insider to increase the expected value of the sanction, which
would make insider trading less profitable. In addition, simplifying pros-
ecution efforts would lower the amount of enforcement resources con-
sumed in convicting violators.
To summarize, the Rule lOb-5 regime's use of general standards in
conjunction with severe penalties may enhance deterrence by producing
an in terrorem effect and by saving judicial resources. The flexibility of
the general standards may reduce the cost of errors in prosecuting inno-
cent persons. These benefits must be weighed against the corresponding
costs that the uncertainty of the general standards has in deterring legiti-
mate activity and encouraging too many defendants to settle. By enhanc-
ing deterrence and conserving judicial resources, the general standards
under the Rule lob-5 regime influence the certainty-severity tradeoff.
2. The Certainty-Severity Tradeoff
Under the Rule lOb-5 regime, the chances of detecting an insider trad-
ing violation are low because insiders can easily conceal their trading.349
Stock exchanges discover most violations through the use of electronic
surveillance.35 ° Once an exchange uncovers questionable trading, 51 the
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 3 (by using regulations that focus on civil liability
present law ignores traditional standards for imposing criminal liability).
346. See Silver, supra note 140, at 1001.
347. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 65-66.
348. See supra note 148 (discussing other proposals for a legislative definition of insider
trading).
349. See D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 19-20. In 1985 and 1986, 83,000 transac-
tions involved opportunities for insider trading; only 468 potential violations were re-
ferred to the SEC. Ultimately, 203 of these were investigated. See id.
350. See Exchanges Are Spending Millions to Detect Illegal Insider Stock Trading, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1099 (July 25, 1986).
351. See Timmeny, McGonigle & Lenett, Defending SEC Insider Trading Investiga-
tions, ALI-ABA Course Materials 213, 213-15 (1989) (when stock prices exceed their
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matter is referred to the SEC. Suspicious trading is not enough to prove
that a person traded upon inside information; the SEC must establish the
connection between the insider's trades and his access to inside informa-
tion through circumstantial evidence.352 Verifying this link, however, is
not difficult with respect to section 16(b) insiders, because it is usually
clear whether the insider had access to inside information.
ITSFEA increased the probability of detecting insider trading by pro-
viding the SEC with the authority to award bounties to informants353
who assist the SEC's enforcement efforts. The IRS, for example, has effi-
ciently enhanced its enforcement efforts by using a bounty program,354
and most people believe that the mere presence of the SEC's "price-on-
his-head" program 355 will provide some deterrence. 356 Despite the IRS's
success, however, some commentators question whether the SEC's
bounty provision will result in a net increase in enforcement because the
SEC currently receives more tips than it has time to investigate.357 In
addition, some commentators argue that the bounty program itself may
actually undermine efforts to impose a self-policing duty upon firms; in-
formants may try to claim bounty rewards rather than comply with the
firm's internal surveillance program.35 8 Congress resolved this conflict,
however, by giving the SEC absolute discretion to award bounties.359
In addition to a low probability of detection, the Rule lOb-5 regime
produces high enforcement costs. ITSFEA's legislative history acknowl-
edges: "Perhaps the greatest problem in the battle against insider trading
is a lack of resources." 3" In response to this problem, ITSFEA declared
historical prices, SRO's conduct preliminary investigation; the SROs monitor large
volumes of trading preceding corporate announcements).
352. As ITSFEA's legislative history notes: "[P]art of the problem in deterring and
punishing insider trading violations is the difficulty of effectively prosecuting these cases.
The biggest obstaclp is making the vital connection between an investor and the posses-
sion of inside information (i.e., what he knew, when he knew it and how he found it
out)." 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 15; see also Ingrassia, Trying Task- For SEC,
Developing Insider-Trading Cases Is Frustrating Work, Wall St. J., July 2, 1986, at 1, col.
5. (only 15-20 percent of SEC investigations successful).
353. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
354. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 15-16 (during 1986, IRS received $256
million as a result of $1.3 million in bounty payments); Franklin, Mutiny over the
Bounty?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1988, at 5, col. 2 (between 1975 and 1984 IRS collected an
average of $16.4 million, with rewards averaging $456,000). The IRS uses a sliding scale
for its bounties: 10 percent for the first $75,000 recovered, 5 percent for the next $25,000,
and I percent thereafter, capped at $100,000. See id. at 5, col. 2.
355. See Roberts, Securities Lawyers Fear Abuse of New Insider-Trading Bill, L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
356. See id.
357. See, e.g., Levine, Mathews & Callcott, supra note 143, at 88 (prospect of a bounty
may encourage people to provide false information); Roberts, supra note 355, at 1, col. 2
(same); see also D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 24 (questionable whether bounty will be
effective in ferreting out inside traders due to secretive nature of insider trading).
358. See Roberts, supra note 355, at 2, col. 1; D. Langevoort, supra note 44, at 24.
359. See 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 23.
360. Id. at 14.
1989]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
that "the war against insider trading must be fought on many fronts." '36 1
On one front, the SEC has almost doubled its enforcement efforts in the
last four years.362 The Commission, however, has a limited budget,363
which is rapidly consumed in labor-intensive insider trading investiga-
tions. Thus, significant public resources are needed to increase the
probability of detecting insider trading by even a modest amount. There-
fore, on another front, Congress raised enforcement resources at mini-
mum government cost by enlisting private firms to self-police for insider
trading violations." 4
In light of the high costs of detection and enforcement under Rule
lOb-5, ITSA and ITSFEA increased the potential sanctions for insider
trading. When the treble damage remedy available under RICO is taken
into account, the insider now faces the threat of damages seven times the
profits gained or loss avoided by insider trading. This penalty substan-
tially changes the insider's profit calculation, even in the face of the
countermotivating high stakes in the takeover and options markets. Be-
lieving that monetary penalties were insufficient, Congress expanded the
potential prison term from five to ten years, declaring that 'this is the
"type of message white-collar criminals will understand the best. ' 365 In
the past, courts have been reluctant to imprison white-collar criminals.366
Some commentators, however, believe that the jail sentences in recent
insider trading cases represent a new trend in the deterrence of insider
trading.3 67
The efficiency of a deterrence strategy can be enhanced by employing
different types of punishment.368 Some commentators argue that impos-
ing a sufficiently large fine upon white-collar criminals would result in
the same level of deterrence provided by imposing a short prison term,
without consuming scarce prison resources.369 Like most commentators,
361. Id.
362. From 1934 to 1984, the SEC brought a total of 121 enforcement proceedings
under Rule 10b-5. The SEC brought 105 cases during 1984 to 1987. See S. Winer & P.
Butler, supra note 160, at 4.
363. See Sontag, "Desperate" SEC Seeks More Aid, Nat'l L.J., May 1, 1989, at 1, col. 4
(many people considering self-funding for the SEC because it is unlikely that Congress
will appropriate more to SEC's budget).
364. See supra notes 217-224 and accompanying text.
365. 1988 House Report, supra note 4, at 16. The House Committee strongly believed
that "a jail term was the most important deterrent" for insider trading. Moreover, it
stated that "courts should impose jail terms for the commission of these crimes, and
expects that raising the ceiling will increase the certainty of substantial prison sentences."
Id. at 23.
366. See Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White Collar Offender, 17 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 479 (1980).
367. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
368. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1077.
369. See, e.g., K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 33 (prison term not much of
deterrence due to judge's reluctance to impose it); Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-
Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409, 410 (1980) (a large fine is preferable to
prison terms because it is less expensive to impose and provides the same deterrence
value).
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Professors Elzinga and Breit question whether a deterrence strategy can
tradeoff large fines and prison terms:
To be assigned to a cell of eighteen by twenty feet, surrounded by stone
and steel walls, and provided with only a cot, table, and stool for fur-
nishings and a sink to wash in is an unattractive prospect, especially
for someone accustomed to a high salary, well-appointed offices, and
living quarters filled with modem conveniences. Perhaps worse, so far
as the businessman is concerned, is the humiliation of being hand-
cuffed, fingerprinted, and whisked away from family and friends by a
United States marshal.37°
Therefore, most commentators argue that even short prison terms will
provide more deterrence than large fines because an insider, comfortable
with his standard of living, will have a difficult time adjusting to the
prison environment.
Under the Rule lOb-5 regime, courts have a great deal of discretion to
correlate the severity of the sanction to the gravity of the harm the in-
sider committed. 7' Such a relationship between conduct and liability)
372Ttwenhances marginal deterrence. In two instances, however, reducing
the penalty imposed upon violators may not promote deterrence. First,
trial courts have rejected the SEC's request for treble damages in a few
cases;373 the conflicting signals sent by the courts and the SEC may lessen
the deterrence value of the treble damage sanction.374 Second, defend-
ants often settle insider trading cases, agreeing to pay a fraction of the
sanction to avoid the risk of a court imposing a heavier sanction.375 The
lower sanctions imposed in settlements may decrease deterrence.376 This
negative effect, however, must be balanced against the savings in re-
sources that can be used to detect and prosecute additional violations.377
Controlling persons face potential penalties up to the greater of
$1,000,000 or three times the insiders' profit gained or loss avoided from
370. K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 43; see also Coffee, Corporate Crime and
Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 419 (1980) (questioning whether large fines and prison terms can be traded off in
the antitrust context); Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 366, at 486 (judges believe
prison provides greatest deterrence to white-collar crime).
371. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 26.
372. See supra notes 318-321 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., SEC v. Karcher, No. 88-2021 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1988) (court rejected
imposition of penalty); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (rejecting
penalty where there were no past violations and future violations are unlikely).
374. See Levine, Mathews & Callcott, supra note 143, at 80-81 ("Ingram and Karcher
may indicate that at least sometimes it is still worthwhile to litigate ... rather than
accepting a settlement that includes an injunction and civil penalties."). The court's re-jection of the SEC's request for treble damages may have a negative effect upon the deter-
rence value of the penalty. This would not occur, however, if the SEC were given the
power to administer the sanction. See Silver, supra note 140, at 963 n.23.
375. See Frankel, supra note 233, at 575.
376. See Note, A Framework, supra note 8, at 1010.
377. See id.
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insider trading.37 ITSFEA provides courts with the discretion to avoid
imposing Draconian sanctions upon smaller firms. Congress probably
set the penalty at a sufficiently high level so that larger firms will also
employ effective self-policing systems. In order to avoid disproportionate
deterrent effects upon different size firms, Congress should eliminate the
$1,000,000 and treble profit or loss avoided caps. The efficiency of the
control person penalty structure would be enhanced if the courts were
given the discretion to impose penalties upon control persons based upon
a percentage of the controlling persons' profits.379
To avoid liability, controlling persons may use internal corporate sanc-
tions to enhance the effectiveness of their self-policing systems. Al-
though private firms are limited in the types of penalties that they can
impose,380 the probability of these sanctions being imposed is high.38 '
Consequently, corporate discipline may result in greater deterrence than
public sanctions.382
In sum, the Rule lOb-5 regime uses severe sanctions to overcome the
problems it faces with detection and enforcement. These severe penal-
ties, however, increase the costs of prosecuting innocent persons and de-
terring legitimate activity. The amount of enforcement resources is
affected by the balance struck under the next tradeoff, between private
versus public enforcement.
3. The Private v. Public Enforcement Tradeoff
This Article adopts the theory that insider trading harms the agency
relationship between management insiders and their corporations. 38 3
Thus, the logical enforcement choice would at first appear to be the
shareholders' derivative suit.384 Like insider trading regulations, deriva-
tive suits seek a high degree of deterrence, with compensation as a secon-
dary objective.385 In the insider trading context, however, derivative
suits would not achieve these goals because shareholders cannot ade-
quately monitor for insider trading. In addition, the control person pro-
visions overcome the shareholder's difficulties with detection by imposing
liability upon corporations that fail to incur bonding costs. Thus, corpo-
rate recovery under a shareholders' derivative suit would conflict with
378. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
379. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 59.
380. See supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
381. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 46. But see Coffee, supra note 370, at 458-60 (little
evidence that fines cause firms to adopt internal disciplinary mechanisms).
382. See R. Posner, supra note 156, at 397-98.
383. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
384. See Haft, supra note 19, at 1068.
385. See id. (citing Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evalua-
tion and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 302-09 (1981)). Pro-
fessor Haft proposes: "[T]he most realistic method to deter insider trading might be to
provide... corporate recovery of double or treble the amount of the insider's profit or
loss avoidance." Id. at 1069.
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the control person provision's goal to penalize firms that fail to establish
self-policing systems.
ITSFEA provided an express right of action for contemporaneous
traders to sue insiders. As discussed previously, however, insider trading
does not harm contemporaneous traders,386 and thus these parties should
not be compensated. In addition, suits by contemporaneous traders con-
flict with the goal of efficient deterrence for three reasons. First, private
parties do not increase the level of detection because they merely free-
ride on the SEC's ability to police for insider trading violations through
electronic surveillance systems.387 Second, the class actions brought by
contemporaneous traders consume an enormous amount of available ju-
dicial resources in defining and certifying the class, giving notices and
processing individual claims. 88 Finally, private attorneys follow the lead
of the SEC and sue in those insider trading cases that promise "the larg-
est judgment with the least [amount] of time." '389 Thus, the problems
with private enforcement are especially acute under the Rule lOb-5
regime.390
As discussed previously, high damage awards motivate private parties
to overenforce the law. This problem does not arise under ITSA and
ITSFEA because the SEC is the only party that can enforce the discre-
tionary treble damages penalties.391 Under RICO, however, private par-
ties can sue to recover mandatory treble damages.392 In the antitrust
context,3 93 the mandatory treble damage provision may cause courts to
take a restrictive interpretation of the law.394 Courts, however, liberally
construe the RICO provisions. 395 Although private parties so far have
had limited success in using RICO, 3 96 the threat of treble damages does
have some settlement value.397
386. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
387. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 16 & n.82 ("private actions play a trivial role in
regulating insider trading [because those] actually brought are largely parasitic").
388. See id.
389. Frankel, supra note 233, at 579.
390. For these reasons, Professor Dooley's conclusion appears valid: "Even if private
suits could be justified on compensatory grounds, the limited ability of private litigants to
initiate enforcement suggests it would be more efficient for the government to collect
damages for private claimants in a parens patriae action." Dooley, supra note 8, at 28
n.134 (citing Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. Legal Stud. 47, 64-66 (1975) (discussing private antitrust actions)).
391. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
392. See Dooley, supra note 8, at 28 (treble damages for private parties will not in-
crease detection).
393. See id. at 24 n. 114; Frankel, supra note 233, at 575.
394. See Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage
Antitrust Action, 14 Seton Hall L. Rev. 17, 22-23 (1983).
395. See Sedima S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
396. Private persons have two hurdles to overcome to sue civilly under RICO. First
they must prove that there were two predicate acts. Second, the insiders must have in-
vested in, maintained an interest in, or participated in an "enterprise." See Brodsky,
supra note 183, at 32.
397. See J. Choper, J. Coffee & C. Morris, supra note 20, at 499.
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In sum, the Rule lOb-5 regime's use of general standards in conjunc-
tion with high penalties produces a high degree of deterrence at minimal
cost. Private causes of action, however, fail to increase detection and
impede efforts to control the level of enforcement. In turning to the sec-
tion 16(b) regime, note that each of the tradeoffs made under the Rule
lOb-5 regime tend to be at the opposite end of the continuum from those
under section 16(b).
C. The Section 16(b) Regime
1. The Specificity-Generality Tradeoff
Section 16(b) "is about as subtle as a sledge hammer":39s an insider
who makes a short-swing trade within six months is automatically liable.
In order for section 16(b)'s specific rule to operate efficiently, the provi-
sion must accurately categorize the prohibited activity.3 99 Because sec-
tion 16(b)'s "crude rule of thumb" does not directly address the insider
trading problem,' courts refer to the statute as "an extremely crude
rule of a most deformed and misshapen thumb.""4  Although a specific
rule is inherently both overinclusive and underinlusive,4°2 these
problems are particularly troublesome under section 16(b).
Commentators and courts criticize section 16(b) for catching minnows
while letting many big fish escape." 3 Section 16(b) is underinclusive be-
398. Woodside, supra note 194, at 476.
Section 16(b) is about as subtle as a sledge hammer, and perhaps this is why
people tend to get a little emotional about it. It doesn't leave much room for
argument. Therein, in part, lies its virtue. The clamor for certainty is pretty
well satisfied in this section of the law. It does not make short-swing trading
illegal. It does not prohibit. It merely says if you trade, pay over the profit. It
speaks with an eloquence not often misunderstood.
Id. at 476-78.
399. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1090. This is especially true in the case of Section
16(b), because the provision focuses on "inchoate violations in which it is not actual harm
but some increased likelihood that harm will occur which provides the principle rationale
for the [restriction]." Id.
400. See, e.g., Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 452 ("Aiming for a dramatic effect, Congress
erred in selecting this bootstrap regulatory method of lumping together the actual abuse
of inside information and the nonuse of inside information in trying to prevent 'the unfair
use of information.' This disparity between the end and the means is the source of section
16(b)'s efficiency defects." (footnote ommited)); Klein, supra note 9, at 8 ("I doubt that
there are many who believe that [section] 16 makes much sense today either as an ap-
proach to insider trading or otherwise.").
401. Provident Secs. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787, 792 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
402. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 270.
403. See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959) ("Congress recog-
nized.., that § 16(b) would not correct all the practices thought to be evil; obviously the
six month limitation alone 'let many fish out of the net'.... "); Ishizumi, supra note 8, at
472 ("One of the most significant sources of inefficiency and inequity under this limitation
is that such insiders can evade liability and pocket virtually all of the speculative profit by
tipping off their confidants. Here again, section 16(b) functions only as a fishing net for
minnows." (footnote omitted)); Munter, supra note 188, at 72-74 (noting the twin di-
lemma of 16(b); its lets many guilty insiders escape while it catches many innocent ones).
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cause it does not apply to persons other than directors, officers, and
greater-than-ten percent beneficial owners of section 12 companies. With
regard to this limited group of insiders, section 16(b) does not cover indi-
vidual purchases or sales, purchases and sales six months or more apart,
or tipping inside information to others to trade.' In addition, although
most insider trading occurs by using options to maximize profits, section
16(b) may not apply to the purchase of options because these derivative
securities are not equity securities of the issuer."
Although section 16(b) applies only to a narrow group of trades, the
section's drafters believed that the mechanical rule would produce a sub-
stantial in terrorem effect.41 6 Section 16(b), however, does not provide
much deterrence because its arbitrary restrictions are easy to evade."°7
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "[1liability cannot be imposed
simply because the investor structure[s] his transaction with the intent of
avoiding liability under § 16(b)."'"'° Hence, an insider can avoid section
16(b) by waiting exactly six months, or by tipping inside information to
-another to conduct the trades." 9 Under the dual system of insider trad-
ing regulation, however, Rule lOb-5 applies to most of the transactions
404. Section 16(b) was initially drafted to prohibit insiders from disclosing "confiden-
tial information" to any other person and provided that the issuer could recover the
profits made by a tippee within six months of the disclosure. See Hearings Before the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1934). The House deleted that provision as well as the provision for insiders'
liability for tipping and left only the reporting provisions now contained in section 16(a).
405. See Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1103-08.
406. In addressing the in terrorem effect of section 16(b), Professors Jennings and
Marsh have argued: "It has never been demonstrated whether this principle of 'Punish
the innocent, in order to terrorize the guilty' works to any extent, and no one has even
made an attempt to produce such evidence." R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 102, at
1402; see also Note, A Framework, supra note 8, at 999 ("Congress accepted the danger of
subjecting the innocent to 16(b) liability in order to obtain maximum deterrence.").
407. As one commentator has noted:
[A]n arbitrarily narrow rule such as section 16(b), when literally applied, tends
to produce inaccurate conclusions concerning its efficiency. Because a rigid rule
allows for easy avoidance, the probability of holding an insider liable under the
objective approach could be much lower than it actually appears.
Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 409. But see Note, A Framework, supra
note 9, at 1004-05 n.81 (section 16(b) successful in deterring limited amount of insider
trading; not meant to deter most insider trading).
408. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
409. As explained by one commentator:
An insider who purchases stock and sells it exactly six months later (e.g., a
purchase at 8:00 a.m. on January 15 followed by a sale at 4:00 p.m. on July 14
would be a transaction of exactly six months) is not within the statutory period
of "less than" six months and is therefore not a target of section 16(b), while an
insider who sells just one day earlier (e.g., at any time on July 13) is subject to
the section.
Ishizumi, supra note 8, at 472 (footnotes omitted); see also Munter, supra note 188, at 73
("The morals of this kind of insider would seem no more worthy of approbation than
those of his brethren who happen to sell one day earlier, and there is no reason to 're-
ward' his cunning."). Note that Rule lOb-5 and state law would still apply to the section
16(b) insider who waits exactly six months.
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that are not covered by section 16(b). Thus, the fact that section 16(b) is
underinclusive is not the primary concern.
Section 16(b)'s major source of inefficiency results from the provision's
overinclusiveness because it indiscriminately penalizes the innocent along
with the guilty.41° Indeed, in describing section 16(b), the Second Circuit
acknowledged: "Congress decided in order to throw out the bathwater
that the baby had to go too."41 An insider intent on trading on inside
information can easily evade section 16(b);a 12 thus, the provision only
results in trapping unwary "minnows," those people who do not receive
the legal advice to wait exactly six months.
In addition to the costs involved in prosecuting innocent people, sec-
tion 16(b) produces a high cost of errors by deterring legitimate business
activity. Section 16(b)'s use of the terms "purchase" and "sale" cover
many transactions that Congress could not have contemplated in 1934.
The section 16(b) insider risks that an imaginative plaintiff's lawyer will
argue that almost any exchange concerning the issuer's stock involves a
section 16(b) purchase or sale. To be safe, the section 16(b) insider must
restructure any transaction that even remotely falls within section 16(b)'s
grasp.413 Although the drafters intended section 16(b) to be a simple
rule, the provision produces "byzantine complexity"; 41 4 the six-month
period serves to "immeasurably complicate[ ], in totally artificial ways,
perfectly legitimate corporate activities such as stock options, stock
appreciation rights, stock redemptions, takeovers, mergers, and
conversions." 415
Section 16(b) produces a high cost of errors that has increased over
time as the rule became obsolete. Two efforts to temper Section 16(b)'s
410. Professor Loss defends section 16(b) as follows: "[I]t would be illusory to pretend
that one could ever have both equity and relative automaticity." L. Loss, supra note 49,
at 1089-90.
411. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967). In defense of the provision, the statute's draftsman maintained: "You have to
have a general rule. In particular transactions it might work a hardship, but those trans-
actions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the necessity of having a general
rule." 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 6558.
412. See Jacobs, supra note 52, at 346 (insiders presumably are aware of section 16(b)
and its provisions); Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 411 ("The American
Law Institute has noted that 'section 16(b) should afford sufficient deterrence to those who
are aware of it....' ") (quoting ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1413 comment 21, at 140 (Tent.
Draft No. 2 (1973))) (emphasis supplied by Note author).
413. See Deitz, supra note 84, at 37 ("The only safe course.., is to refrain from buying
and selling . . ").
414. Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1090 ("[T]he effort to avoid its reach
often adds Byzantine complexity to many employee compensation plans.").
415. Klein, supra note 9, at 10; see also Block & Barton, Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act: An Archaic Insider Trading Statute in Need of Reform, 12 Sec. Reg. L.J. 203, 218
(1984) ("Section 16(b) is plainly archaic in modern hostile takeover battles.").
In addition, these transactions are needlessly complicated because the six-month period
is simply too long given that the value of information quickly dissipates over time. See
Section 16(b) Task Force, supra note 13, at 1088 (arguing three months is long enough);
Klein, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing 30 days is long enough).
[Vol. 58
SECTION 16(b)
harsh effects have only aggravated the problem by adding complexity.416
First, some courts inquire whether there was a possibility for speculative
abuse of inside information under the pragmatic approach.417 These
courts, however, have compounded the confusion over the application of
section 16(b) by alternating between the objective approach and prag-
matic approach in reaching their decisions.418 Second, although the SEC
has used its authority to promulgate rules to exempt transactions from
section 16(b), these rules have become so complex that only experts can
grasp them.419 The SEC's proposed changes420 to these rules are not suf-
ficient to overcome the problems inherent in section 16(b)'s "crude rule
of thumb" approach. To render the area more coherent, Congress
should reevaluate the conceptual foundations of section 16(b).4 21
In review, section 16(b) does not provide deterrence because insiders
can easily evade the clear lines of the simple rule. In addition, s&ction
16(b) produces a high cost of errors by penalizing innocent persons and
deterring legitimate activity. Section 16(b)'s simple rule also influences
the balance struck under the next tradeoff, the certainty-severity tradeoff.
2. The Certainty-Severity Tradeoff
Section 16(b) has a unique enforcement mechanism under which the
corporation or shareholders may sue a section 16(b) insider to recover
short-swing profits on behalf of the corporation.422 The SEC has no
416. See R. Clark, supra note 18, at 300 ("One wonders whether a supposedly flat
prophylactic rule like section 16(b) can long retain its objective character in such a sys-
tem of adjudication.").
417. See Note, A Framework, supra note 8, at 999 ("Uncertainties [in the pragmatic
approach] have tempered the strong prevention influence embodied in the section's
mechanical six-month test.").
418. See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
419. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 270. These rules also involve high ad-
ministrative costs for the SEC as well as section 16(b) insiders. See Ownership Reports,
supra note 272, at 89,600 (citation omitted) (SEC receives more requests for no-action
advice concerning section 16 rules than any other area); see also Schwartz, supra note 8,
at 1089 ("specifying in advance a series of stererotyped criteria that keep process costs
low").
420. See Ownership Reports, supra note 272, at 89,598; see also Ehrlich & Posner, supra
note 288, at 277 (must alter rules "to keep pace with economic and technological
change").
421. But see H. Bloomenthal, supra note 158, § 5.12, at 5-41 ("The promise is for a
more reasoned and simplified approach to Section 16(b) liability which, hopefully, will
put to rest its reputation as a trap for the unwary.").
422. A security holder has the right to bring a section 16(b) action regardless of the
good faith or reasonable business judgment of the corporation's directors in deciding not
to bring suit. See Comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an Alleged 16(b)
Violation, 1968 Duke L.J. 94, 99-101. Section 16(b) expressly provides that "the owner of
any security of the issuer" can bring suit; therefore, an action under section 16(b) is not
subject to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regulating derivative actions
by shareholders, which requires the plaintiff to have been a security holder at the time of
the alleged violation. See Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); L.
Loss, supra note 49, at 1052. Consequently, a section 16(b) plaintiff may purchase a
single share after the violation for the sole purpose of bringing suit.
1989]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
power to enforce section 16(b),423 and unlike most provisions of the 1934
Act, section 16(b) does not give rise to criminal liability.4 24 Private en-
forcement efforts are facilitated by the summaries of section 16(a) reports
that the SEC publishes each month.425 These reports provide the means
for discovering section 16(b) violations. In addition, the courts promote
private enforcement by awarding high attorney's fees in section 16(b)
cases. These fees provide the motivating factor behind most section
16(b) suits because shareholders only indirectly benefit from corporate
recovery.426
Section 16(b)'s private enforcement mechanism produces a high
probability of detecting section 16(b) violations. The prospect of liberal
attorneys' fees provides a strong incentive for the section 16(b) plaintiffs'
bar to serve as an ever-hungry watchdog over the monthly section 16(a)
reports.427 Once a violation is detected, the plaintiff usually will succeed
in proving liability because it is usually clear whether a violation has
occurred.428 Under the objective approach, enforcement costs are low
because there is a high probability that the parties will settle.429 To the
extent that the courts use the pragmatic approach and definitional uncer-
tainties remain, parties have an incentive to litigate.430 The pragmatic
approach leads to costly suits that involve inquiries similar to those in
Rule lOb-5 cases:431 under the pragmatic approach it is necessary to
show the "possibility of speculative abuse" of inside information,
423. The SEC, however, may adopt rules exempting certain transactions that are not
within the purpose of the section. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to 240.16b-l 1 (1989).
424. The drafters of section 16(b) deleted provisions imposing criminal sanctions from
early drafts of the provision believing that such sanctions were too harsh. See Cook &
Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 407
(1953) (citing 15 Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84,
56, and 97, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6430 (1934)).
425. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
426. Courts grant substantial attorney's fees in section 16(b) actions which may be as
high as one-half of the profits recovered. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,
241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1052.
427. See L. Loss, supra note 44, at 550 (citing Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 523 F.2d
680, 689 (7th Cir. 1975)); Ishuzumi, supra note 8, at 462 (Congress may have thought
that "100% enforcement was... the most inexpensive method for society to prevent the
abuses of insider information."); Note, A Framework, supra note 8, at 1005 ("The
probability that an offender will be punished ... for a 16(b) violation has been brought
very close to one through a combination of procedural and reporting techniques.").
428. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 407-08.
429. See Jacobs, supra note 52, at 346 ("Congress hoped section 16(b)'s application
would require little judicial interpretation. Indeed, the volume of section 16(b) cases over
the years, particularly recently, has been quite small considering the section's practical
importance.").
430. Justice Douglas once remarked: "Instead of a section that is easy to administer
and by its clearcut terms discourages litigation, we have instead a section that fosters
litigation because the [pragmatic approach] holds out the hope for the insider that he may
avoid § 16(b) liability." Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582, 612 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
431. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 425.
[Vol. 58
SECTION 16(b)
whereas Rule lOb-5 requires the actual abuse of inside information.4 32
Although section 16(b)'s private enforcement system operates at low
cost, the efficient operation of this system only serves to raise the costs of
errors produced by section 16(b)'s overinclusive rule. The high rate of
detection of section 16(b) violations includes people who have not traded
upon inside information, and thus guarantees that businesspersons will
forgo legitimate conduct. In addition, section 16(b)'s penalty structure
aggravates the costs of errors because the in terrorem penalty does not
follow the principle of marginal deterrence.
Unlike most specific rules that employ strict liability,4 33 section 16(b)
imposes a penalty if the insider engages in a series of transactions.434
Courts calculate the amount of section 16(b) "profits" to be disgorged by
using the "lowest-in-highest-out" method. Under this method, the low-
est purchase price is matched against the highest sale price, the next low-
est purchase price is matched against the next highest sale price, and so
forth in order to disgorge the largest amount of profit possible.435 Courts
adopted this method to enhance section 16(b)'s in terrorem effect; even in
settlement procedures, courts usually insist on imposing the full amount
of recovery under the high-low calculation.436 This method, however,
produces bizarre results that have no relation to the wrong committed.437
432. See id.
433. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 269.
434. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.) (liability of over $300,000
even though transactions resulted in $400,000 loss), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
See generally Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 Mich. L. Rev. 649, 650
(1964) (transactions are sometimes broken down into whatever components are necessary
to create a matching that maximizes profits). Transactions used in this process cover a
period ofjust under one year. See L. Soderquist, supra note 46, at 489 ("For example, in
the case of a 100 share sale on July 1, 50 shares involved in a matching could have been
purchased on February 1 and 50 on November 1, even though February and November
are more than six months apart.").
435. In adopting this method the Second Circuit reasoned:
The statute is broadly remedial. . . . We must suppose that the statute was
intended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock trans-
actions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict be-
tween the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the
faithful performance of his duty.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
436. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (settlement for less
than full amount defeats Congress' goal of disgorgement). In some cases, if the corpora-
tion's recovery is doubtful, a court is likely to accept less than the maximum recovery.
See, e.g, Plaskow v. Clausing Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) q 99,228, at 95,978 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1983) ($34,500 settlement; $49,000 possible
recovery); Lewis v. Chapman, 416 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
437. The method for calculating the amount to be disgorged has been subject to severe
criticism: "[T]he SEC has gotten so fascinated with the algebraic formulae which a fertile
mind can conceive under Section 16(b) that it has never walked away a hundred paces
and taken a good look at the monstrosity which has been created . . . ." Calderwood,
Section 16(b)-Another Noble Experiment Gone Wrong 32 (address before American So-
ciety of Corporate Secretaries, New York, New York, April 21, 1960) quoted in L. Loss,
supra note 48, at 1088 n.212. Some commentators are concerned with the problem of
double liability under section 16(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Ishuzumi, supra note 8, at 453-
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Thus, section 16(b)'s high rate of detection and unusual penalty structure
increase the errors caused by the overinclusive aspects of the rule.
3. The Private v. Public Enforcement Tradeoff
Section 16(b)'s corporate recovery approach is consistent with the the-
ory that insider trading harms the agency relationship between managers
and their corporations. Some commentators have applauded section
16(b)'s reliance on private enforcement, exclaiming that it is "rare good
fortune when controls can be self-executing, without government inter-
position.""43 While in most circumstances this is true, this is not the case
with section 16(b), because the efficiency of the enforcement mechanism
increases the cost of errors produced by the simple rule. Because section
16(b)'s crude rule of thumb does not accurately categorize insider trading
violations, the efficient enforcement mechanism operates to catch insiders
who are not using inside information and to deter legitimate business
activity. In most cases where a specific rule is employed, the problem of
overinclusiveness is handled by providing enforcement officials with the
discretion to waive application of the rule.4 39 As noted previously, how-
ever, the SEC has no enforcement power under section 16(b), and private
parties motivated by attorney's fees will not take into account the pur-
pose of the regulation. Indeed, the section promotes champerty;" 0 for
example, it would be possible for an attorney who discovers a section
16(b) violation to give a plaintiff enough money to buy one share of stock
for the sole purpose of bringing a section 16(b) suit."'
In sum, the section 16(b) regime's simple rule does not promote deter-
rence and produces a high cost of errors. In comparing the tradeoffs
made under the two systems of insider trading regulation, it becomes
apparent that the strengths of one scheme correspond to the weaknesses
of the other.
D. A Comparative Analysis of the Rule 10b-5 and Section 16(b)
Deterrence Strategies
Under the first tradeoff, the section 16(b) regime and the Rule lOb-5
55. The issue of double liability was recently litigated in National Westminster Bancorp
NJ v. Leone, 702 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (D.N.J. 1988). The National court held that sec-
tion 16(b) does not intend for the corporation to recover that part of insider profits dis-
gorged in settlement of a SEC fraud action. See id. at 1140.
438. Cary, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 860 (1962).
439. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 288, at 268.
440. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 408 (the social costs of cham-
perty are outweighed by the public benefits from private enforcement). Champerty is not
a defense to a section 16(b) action. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
441. See 2 T. Hazen, Securities Regulation § 12.3, at 23 n.21 (2d ed. 1990) ("The ra-
tionale of these cases is that it is up to the state or federal bar to take appropriate discipli-
nary action against the attorney. Attorney misconduct thus should not interfere with the
remedial purposes of section 16(b).").
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regime are at opposite ends of the specificity-generality continuum.2
Section 16(b)'s unwieldy rule provides clarity, but it creates a great risk
that it will automatically and indiscriminately apply to innocent persons.
The Rule lOb-5 regime, while it is more expensive to enforce, provides
safeguards to protect innocent persons. 44 Although the standards under
Rule 10b-5 produce uncertainty in some instances, the fiduciary duty and
the control person standards clearly apply to section 16(b) insiders in
most cases. The flexibility of the materiality standard under Rule lOb-5
and the recklessness standard under the control person provisions pro-
vide efficiency benefits that outweigh the loss in certainty. In addition,
unlike the Rule 10b-5 regime's vague standards, which provide a built-in
mechanism for change, section 16(b)'s simple rule cannot adapt to new
situations and has become obsolete.
ITSFEA enhanced the severity-certainty tradeoff under the Rule lOb-5
regime by providing bounties to increase the probability of detection,
control person liability to provide enforcement resources, and longer
prison terms to increase the sanctions imposed. Controlling person pen-
alties, however, that are based upon a sliding scale using a percentage of
the control person's profits would provide more deterrence.444
Unlike the problems with detection and prosecution under Rule lOb-5,
section 16(a)'s reporting and section 16(b)'s simple provisions lead to a
high probability of detection and low cost of enforcement. If one focuses
solely on the enforcement mechanism of the section 16(b) regime, rather
than on the choice of rule itself, there would appear to be no reason to
repeal section 16(b). When the rule's overinclusiveness is taken into ac-
count, however, section 16(b)'s high cost of errors clearly outweighs the
savings in process costs.
Although the penalty imposed under section 16(b) aggravates the cost
of errors, some commentators have argued that the penalty calculation
under the high-low method enhances deterrence." 5 To the contrary, this
penalty is merely a transfer of wealth from section 16(b) insiders to the
legal profession with no corresponding increase in efficient enforcement
of the insider trading laws. One could have argued that the section 16(b)
442. See L. Loss, supra note 44, at 543 ("[Section] 16(b) and Rule lob-5 are at opposite
jurisprudential poles on the objective-subjective or predictability-fairness continuum.");
Dooley, supra note 8, at 57 ("[T]he narrow scope of [section 16(b)] is attributable to a
failure of imagination, subsequently remedied by the creative development of rule lob-5
to regulate informational advantages more comprehensively.").
443. But see Jacobs, supra note 52, at 347 ("Section 16(b)'s occasional trapping of the
unwary is clearly an insufficient ground to repeal the statute. A breach of rule lOb-5,...
is much harder to prove.").
444. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 8, at 132-38.
445. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.) (overall intent of the statute is
to serve as a deterrent and for that reason it may be well in some instances to impose a
"crushing liabilitty]"), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). But see L. Loss, supra note 44,
at 560 ("It might [be more] apt to recall the condemned prisoner who, when asked if he
had any last words before the noose was pulled, replied: 'Yes, sir, this sure is gonna teach
me a lesson.' ").
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penalty provided some deterrence prior to 1984, however, this argument
became invalid after Congress implemented a treble damage penalty for
insider trading under ITSA. The substantial penalties currently available
under the Rule lOb-5 regime provide more effective and efficient deter-
rence than section 16(b)'s bizarre high-low penalty structure.
Under the third tradeoff, using a shareholders' derivative suit as an
enforcement mechanism would compensate for the harm that insider
trading imposes upon the agency relationship between managers and
their corporations. Allowing a derivative suit under the Rule lOb-5 re-
gime, however, would conflict with the control person provision's goal to
penalize firms that fail to establish effective self-policing systems. Section
16(b)'s corporate recovery approach not only compensates the correct
party, it also involves fewer procedural safeguards and thus consumes
less judicial resources than the Rule lob-5 regime's private class action
suits for contemporaneous traders." 6 Section 16(b)'s use of private en-
forcement operates efficiently, but given the nature of the simple rule, it
is rare that any actual insider trading is being detected and prosecuted.
In conclusion, an economic analysis of the weapons used to combat
insider trading demonstrates that the Rule lOb-5 regime has a high de-
gree of deterrence, avoiding the costs resulting from section 16(b)'s fail-
ure in attempting to achieve maximum deterrence."' ITSA and
ITSFEA have efficiently increased the deterrence aspect of insider trad-
ing regulation under Rule lob-5 to such an extent that it is no longer
necessary to suffer the costs of section 16(b)'s "spring gun" approach.
The same level of deterrence accomplished by section 16(b) could be
achieved with far less cost by control persons through their self-policing
systems. Thus, section 16(b) regulation wastes valuable resources that
are desperately needed to deter insider trading under the Rule lOb-5
regime.448
CONCLUSION
The shock waves from the insider trading scandals have created pres-
sure for the overhaul of insider trading regulation. While most of the
controversy over insider trading regulation has focused on the Rule lOb-
5 regime, some of the pressure for reform has spilled over to section
16(b). Although an ABA Task Force reviewed section 16(b) in 1987,
and although the SEC reviewed the rules promulgated thereunder in
1988 and 1989, these reform efforts are inadequate; new weapons in the
insider trading arsenal have rendered section 16(b) obsolete.
Attention should focus upon the repeal of section 16(b) because Con-
gress will return to the insider trading problem in the future. Thus, Con-
446. See R. Clark, supra note 18, at 263.
447. But see Carlton & Fischel, supra note 28, at 861-66 (public enforcement with high
penalties might deter a significant amount of insider trading, particularly because regula-
tors, unlike firms, are not disciplined by markets).
448. See Note, A Framework, supra note 8, at 1006-07.
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gress may have a rare opportunity to repeal this anachronistic provision:
fifty-five years of experience with section 16(b) reveal that it is not a ra-
tional and efficient deterrence system. In taking a tough stance on in-
sider trading, Congress should not let the passion of the insider trading
wars allow "a triumph of politics over principle." 9 If this occurs, when
the passion subsides and the next decade brings a new white-collar crime,
we will be left with section 16(b) and will have lost a valuable
opportunity.
449. Macey, supra note 283, at 9.

